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The U. S. Army uses cash selective reenlistment bonuses (SRB) to encourage sol-
diers in selected military occupation specialities (MOS) to reenlist. Estimates of the
reenlistment rate as a function of bonus level are needed for each MOS as input to a
bonus allocation model. This thesis outlines and uses a new method for predicting the
reenlistment rates as a function of bonus level.
The approach involves partitioning the soldier population into cells with stable
reenlistment rates using demographic variables. The cells are aggregated using clustering
techniques to produce groups of cells which exhibit homogeneity of reenlistment be-
havior. Regression models are developed for each group of cells. MOS reenlistment
rates are determined as a linear combination across cells. Cross-validation techniques
are used to lend credibility to the predictive model.
The study points out the usefulness of identifying categories of soldiers who display
unique reenlistment behavior. Integration of this technique with existing econometric
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I. INTRODUCTION
A. GENERAL
Retaining qualified soldiers in the military after their terms of service are complete
continues to be one of the key issues in the all-volunteer Army. Reenlisting good sol-
diers protects the military's extensive investment in training, and provides the stream of
soldiers needed for leadership and supervisor}' positions. Reenlistmcnts are also a pow-
erful force alignment tool for the Army to balance job skills and grade structure. Al-
though there are many ways for personnel managers to influence reenlistment behavior,
the reenlistment cash bonus continues to be the most powerful and responsive tool
available.
The United States military has utilized reenlistment bonuses since the early 1960s
to improve retention in the services. Since 1974, however, the reenlistment bonuses have
been "selective", targeted at specially designated military job skills. To assist military
personnel managers in determining which job skills should receive reenlistment bonuses,
a large-scale optimization model was developed and refined at the Naval Postgraduate
School [Ref. 1: pp. 1-3]. This mathematical model recommends a set of bonuses that
attempts to minimize the expected deviation from a desired force structure under the
constraint ol~ a given budget. A brief description of this military reenlistment bonus
model is in Appendix A.
Use of the military reenlistment bonus model by the U. S. Army is currently limited
because of the inadequacy of one of the model inputs, the predicted reenlistment rates.
These rates estimate the number of soldiers who will reenlist for each different job skill
at each potential bonus level. 1 The military reenlistment bonus model uses these as in-
puts to determine the most effective method to spend the limited bonus budget.
The purpose of this study is to develop a model to estimate the reenlistment bonus
response rates for U. S. Army enlisted personnel for use in the military reenlistment bo-
nus model.
1 It is important to understand that bonuses are a treatment, whose effect on the soldier pop-
ulation is uncertain.
B. BACKGROUND
Rcenlistment cash bonuses are executed in the U. S. military through the selective
reenlistment bonus (SRB) program. The "selective" bonuses are targeted at specially
designated military occupation specialities (VIOS) and year-of-service interval (/one)
combinations. The U. S. Army currently has over 350 different MOS's. Year-of-service
intervals are broken into three zones as follows:
Zone A 2-6 years-of-service
Zone B 6-10 years-of-service
Zone C 10-14 years-of-service 2
MOS and zone combinations are called cells, and there are over 1000 cells to which
the military reenlistment bonus model assigns bonus multipliers. The cash amount of a
bonus is computed as follows in Equation 1. where SRB is the cash bonus amount,
MBP is the soldier's current monthly base pay, YR is the number of years the soldier
reenlists for. and MULTU is the bonus multiplier for MOS / and zone j.
SRB = MBP x YR x MlLTtj (1)
One half of the bonus is paid as a lump sum on the day the soldier reenlists. The re-
mainder is paid in equal yearly installments over the duration of the reenlistment term.
Bonus multipliers range between zero and six, and although public law allows them to
take on continuous values, the Army restricts them to increments of 0.5. At any given
time, 15-25% of the 1000 cells have non-zero bonus multipliers, and the Army's yearly
budget for the bonus program is from S50-100 million.
The U. S. Army is currently experimenting by allowing bonus multipliers to vary by
rank within an MOS and zone combination. For example, an infantryman in Zone A
who achieves the rank of sergeant could receive a higher bonus than soldier of the rank
of specialist, a lower rank. 3 The purpose is to encourage more high quality soldiers to
reenlist.4 This experiment causes the bonus multiplier to have three dimensions,
( MILT, ik ) of MOS, zone, and rank. While this study does not address the issue of
2 Soldiers with under two or over fourteen years-of-service are not eligible for reenlistment
bonuses. Zone A is extended sightly, to allow soldiers who enlist for two years an opportunity to
reenlist prior to the end of their service term.
3 The rank of sergeant is pay grade E5. The rank of specialist is pay grade E4.
4 The assumption is that rank is a good measure of soldier quality, an assumption that is used
in this study.
rank as a dimension of the bonus multiplier, the method outlined here is adaptable to
this approach.
Soldiers enlist in the military by signing a contract that obligates them to specific
terms of service (usually two to four years). As they near the end of their enlistment





A soldier signs a new contract, obligating him or her to
a new term of two to six years. Bonuses are for
reenlistments of three years or more, and the length of
the reenlistment affects the amount of the bonus pay-
ment.
Soldiers also may reenlist, but migrate to a new MOS.
Normally this is from an overstrength to an under-
strength MOS. Usually, migrating soldiers do not receive
bonuses.
>
Extending soldiers defer their reenlistment decision. Ex-
tensions are for up to two years, and soldiers do not re-
ceive bonuses for extending. Many soldiers extend
because they are currently ineligible to reenlist. and they
try to become eligible during the extension period. Other
soldiers extend to wait for more favorable bonus multi-
pliers. Soldiers also extend to meet schooling, training,
deployment, overseas assignment or retirement time re-
maining in service requirements. Because they are a de-
ferred reenlistment decision, extensions are a major
complicating factor to this study. They are addressed in
Appendix B.
End of term of service. A soldier who does not make any
of the above decisions is discharged from the service at
the end of the contract period.
Soldiers are allowed to reenlist up to eight months prior to the end of their current
term of enlistment. Like extensions, this policy also clouds the issue of who is eligible
to reenlist at any given time. This issue is also addressed in Appendix B.
The above discussion serves to highlight a few important aspects of the SRB pro-
gram. Eor a more detailed overview of the reenlistment system, consult "The Effects of
Selective Reenlistment Bonuses on Retention." by Donald J. Cymrot [Rcf. 2: pp. 4-9].
C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS
The purpose of this section is to provide the motivation for the specific research areas
that will be pursued during this study.
5 Migrating soldiers can expect faster promotion rates in their new shortage MOS.
1. MOS Grouping
This study is sponsored by the U. S. Total Army Personnel Command,
Alexandria. Virginia. Their task is to develop a model to estimate reenlistment response
rates for use in the military reenlistment bonus model. A brief review of the input form
required by the bonus optimization model motivates the approach of the study. Figure
1 shows a graphical example of the input requirement for the military reenlistment bonus
model.
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Figure 1. Sample of Input Required for Bonus Model (Hypothetical)
The military reenlistment bonus model requires as input a function that takes a specified
bonus level and outputs the expected reenlistment rate, by MOS.
6
A point to note is that the above example is MOS and zone specific. The bonus
optimization model requires over 1000 such functions (one for each cell). However, the
computer resources arc not available to execute the 1000 different regression models
6 The actual function is input into the military reenlistment bonus model as a point estimate
for each of the various bonus levels.
necessary to develop the 1000 different response functions. The goal of this study is to
develop a methodology to reduce the number of regression models, by some appropriate
grouping technique.
A brief review of past attempts at grouping of MOS's gives some perspective to
this research question. The first attempts at grouping combined all MOS's together.
They estimated one set of reenlistment response rates for all MOS's. One study taking
this approach is Enns [Ref. 3: pp. 1-3]. The problem with this approach is that there is
evidence of the varying effects of reenlistment bonuses among MOS's. The strongest
evidence of this is found in research by Lakhani and Gilroy [Ref. 4: p. 253].
The next attempt was to estimate a separate reenlistment response for each dif-
ferent MOS. In addition to the problem noted above (the requirement for 1000 different
regression equations), there are a number of additional problems with this approach.
The fust problem is that since bonuses are allocated by MOS. it follows that all soldiers
within the same MOS (and zone) receive the same bonus [Ref. 5: p. vi]. This limits the
number of observations at different bonus levels available for use in the regression. To
further complicate this problem, only 15-25% of the over 1000 cells have non-zero bonus
multipliers at any given time. Large numbers of cells never have a bonus, or have such
a limited bonus history that estimation by regression techniques is meaningless.
A second problem with estimating a separate reenlistment response rate for each
MOS is that bonuses within a speciality often do not change from year to year. This is
caused by the fact that bonuses are often given to critical MOS's. and these MOS's re-
main critical over time. One study by Ilosek and Peterson [Ref. 6: pp. 19-22] estimates
the correlation of bonus levels in adjoining time periods to be 0.8 for specialities receiv-
ing a bonus. "This correlation causes the regression model to behave poorly.
A third problem is that this technique assumes the MOS is a homogeneous
grouping of soldiers with similar reenlistment probabilities. However in his research.
Kohler questions this assumption and shows that MOS's are not homogeneous
groupings [Ref. 5: p. 4].
To correct for the deficiencies with estimating reenlistment response rates, most
researchers have grouped MOS's. The advantage to this approach is that by grouping
MOS's with varying bonus levels together, the regression estimates become more
meaningful. Two basic approaches are used. The first approach is to group MOS's into
career management fields (CMF's). The Army currently has 32 CMF's. Studies using
this technique include a study of Army reenlistment and extension decisions by Lakhani
and Gilroy [Ref. 4: p. 232]. The problem with this approach is that the CMF's are ad-
ministrative groupings, and CMF's often group occupations with little in common [Ref.
5: p. A}.
The second approach is to assign MOS's into groups with similar job charac-
teristics. These characteristics tend to key on how technical is the job, what is the skills
potential combat exposure, or what are the skills civilian opportunities. Presented below




• Communications electronic operations
• Communications electronic maintenance
• Mechanical maintenance





Groupings such as these make intuitive sense. However, analysis supporting use of these
groupings is lacking. The key point is the goal of grouping is not only to reduce the
number of regressions to be performed, but also to form groups with similar reenlistment
behavior. Therefore, to improve the quality of the estimates of reenlistment response
rates, this study develops techniques to identify groupings of soldiers with similar
reenlistment probabilities.
2. Variables to be Considered
The study of the effects of reenlistment bonuses is not a trivial problem. It is
difficult to determine why soldiers decide to stay or leave the service. There are many
factors which impact a soldier's reenlistment decision, as diverse as what the job oppor-
tunities in his hometown are, to whether he is well adjusted within his organization, to
what the congressional action is on pay raises for the next year. The reenlistment deci-
sion is based not only on the bonus offered, but upon many other factors, both quanti-
fiable and unquantifiable. The impact of these other factors is seen in Figure 2. which
is a scatterplot of quarterly reenlistment rates for ten different Zone A MOS's over four
vears. as a function of the bonus level. Although there is a eeneral increasing trend in
the reenlistment rate, many other factors are working to produce the observed variance.
Without the explanatory effect of other variables, it is difficult to determine the true ef-
fects of reenlistment bonus.
REENLISTMENT RATES AS A FUNCTION OF BONUS MULTIPLIER
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Figure 2. Yearly Reenlistment Rates for Ten MOS's Over Seven Years
Many researchers fail to examine the full range of potential, quantifiable ex-
planatory variables available. For example, the 1982 CAA study uses only three ex-
planatory variables: the bonus level, unemployment, and the inflation rate [Ref. 7: p.
4-10]. Only two studies, a study by Chow and Polich [Ref. 8: pp. 29-31] and a study by
Hiller [Ref. 9: pp. 20-31] examine a full range of variables.
This study examines a full range of potential, quantifiable explanatory variables.
First, a theoretical framework of the reenlistment decision making process is developed.
This framework guides the selection of variables and the gathering of data. Exploratory
data analysis techniques are used to determine which of the variables are most appro-
priate for inclusion in the regression equations. Cross-validation is used to lend credi-
bilitv to this analysis.
Special attention is paid to the effects of variables that the Army manipulates
to influence retention. Variables the Army manipulates in this manner are called force
alignment variables.
3. Summary of Research Questions
In summary, the following are the primary research questions of this study.
• Which variables to include in the models?
• How do force alignment variables impact reenlistment?
• How to group soldiers to reduce the number of regression models required, and
ensure homogeneous groupings?
• How to address MOS migration and extensions, along with reenlistment eligibility
requirements without complicating the model?
• What confidence to place in the estimates?
D. SCOPE OF THESIS
Due to the stated purpose of this study, research is limited to active duty U. S. Army
enlisted soldiers, with between 2 and 14 years-of-service. Within this framework, the
emphasis is placed on Zone A reenlistments. 7 as the large majority of the bonus recipi-
ents are in Zone A.
Because of the extensive research conducted in this area, an attempt is made to draw
on previous studies to put together a comprehensive study of estimating reenlistment
behavior for the L\ S. Army. However, because of the requirement to estimate coeffi-
cients for all MOS s, individual MOS differences which warrant special attention are for
the most part ignored.
One final note. This stud}' does not address the issue of quality of the reenlisting
soldier. Because the military reenlistment bonus model does not distinguish between
soldiers, all soldiers qualified to reenlist are assumed to be of equal quality.
s
E. ORGANIZATION OF THESIS
Chapter II is a review of the literature relevant to the estimation of reenlistment
response rates.
7 Zone A extends from 2-6 vears-of-service (YOS), Zone B from 6-10 YOS and Zone C from
10-14 YOS.
8 The experiment outlined in the introduction, (page 2) which treats rank as a separate di-
mension, attempts to address the quality issue. However within the new cell (dimensioned by
MOS. zone and rank), all soldiers are considered of equal quality and the same assumption is made
here.
Chapter III develops a theoretical framework for the reenlistment process, and the
data base is structured using this framework.
Chapter IV describes the solution technique.
Chapter V shows, in detail, the solution of the Zone A problem. Chapter V also
discusses the validation of the Zone A model and the precision of the model. Chapter
VI gives the conclusions and recommendation for further study.
The appendices contain various details of interest to the reader, including back-
ground on the military reenlistment bonus model, details on how the study details with
factors such as VI OS migration and extensions and issues such as variable selection, data
set cleaning, regression models and statistical tests.
F. STATISTICAL PACKAGES
The statistical package used in this study is SAS. by the SAS Institute. Graphics
was done using a pre-release version of GRAPIISTAT by IBM.
II. REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE
A. GENERAL
The purpose of this chapter is to review the literature on the estimation of
reenlistment rates, with the purpose of providing motivation for the techniques of this
study. The issue of reenlistment bonuses is well studied; this review addresses only a
portion of the work done.
B. ARMY STUDIES
The 1982 Concepts Analysis Agency (CAA) study addresses both a method for op-
timizing bonus payments, and estimates of reenlistment bonus response rates [Rcf. 7: p.
4-16]. The study calls these rates SRB effectiveness coefficients, and the coefficients they
estimated in 19S2 are still in use today by the Force Alignment Branch of the U. S. Total
Army Personnel Command.
The CAA study uses 1976-1981 data and variables to measure the bonus level, the
unemployment rate, and the inflation rate. Over 320 MOS's are grouped into ten skill
groups.9 and linear regression models arc used to estimate the SRB effectiveness coeffi-
cients. 10 The study does not estimate reenlistment rates, instead it recommends use of
the current reenlistment rate as the forecast reenlistment rate.
A second study of Army bonus response rates, by Higham [Ref. 10: pp. 9-13], uses
linear regression and variables that measure the bonus level, year, calender quarter, un-
employment rate and inflation rate to estimate reenlistment rates. The study estimates
reenlistment rates for twenty-four MOS's with good bonus histories, and then describes
techniques to extrapolate the results to the remaining 300 MOS's.
Both of these studies use linear regressions; Appendix I explains why logistic re-
gression is preferred over linear regression in studies such as these. Both studies also
examine a limited number of explanatory variables. One of the goals of this study is to
examine a large number of variables for inclusion in the model. Neither study presents
cross-validation results for their models. This study uses cross-validation to ensure
model fit.
9 These skill groups are listed on page 6
10 The SRB effectiveness coefficients are the percentage increase in the reenlistment rate due
to a one step increase in the bonus multiplier.
10
Another study of recnlistment propensities has been done by economists of the
Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences [Ref. 4: pp. 229-232].
The study uses bonus levels, a civilian military wage index, the unemployment rate, the
soldier's AFQT scored, race, family size and groups soldiers by career management
field. This study is interesting in two respects. First, it examines three choices in the
reenlistment decision making process, and therefore applies multinomial logistic re-
gression. The three choices are to reenlist. to extend, or to leave the service. Re-
searchers are split over whether to treat the extension decision as a separate choice, or
to treat it as a deferred reenlistment decision. Our study chooses to treat extensions as
a deferred reenlistment decision. Appendix B gives further explanation and justification.
A second interesting aspect of the study is the grouping of MOS's into career man-
agement fields. l- Many MOS's do not have adequate enough bonus histories for re-
gression models. Therefore, most studies group MOS's, either into career management
fields or into groupings with similar job characteristics. A goal of our study is to ex-
amine an alternative grouping technique, in which soldiers are grouped according to
their recnlistment probabilities, regardless of which MOS's they are in.
A final Army study discussed here is by two economists at the United States Mili-
tary Academy [Ref. 11: pp. 211-212]. This study points to the examination of demo-
graphic variables, such as race. sex. and family size as the method to form homogeneous
groupings of soldiers with similar reenlistment probabilities. This method is followed in
Chapter V of this study.
C. ACOL STUDIES
The Navy has done extensive research into the prediction of reenlistment response
rates. The annualized cost of leaving model (ACOL) represents the current state of the
art of its research [Ref. 12: pp. 2-5]. ACOL models the reenlistment decision making
process by examining the present value of the soldier's military pay potential and his or
her civilian pay potential. It also examines the soldier's "taste for military service". The
model has a great deal of potential; however, it does carry some difficult to validate as-
sumptions, such as the time horizon over which a soldier makes a decision, his or her
discount rate, what their civilian earnings potential is, and whether the soldier's percep-
tions of his or her earning potential is close to realistic.
11 AFQT is the Armed Forces Qualification Test
12 Career management fields are an administrative grouping of MOS's used by personnel
managers to administer personnel programs.
11
One study that uses this ACOL methodology is a Marine Corps study by Cymrot
[Ref. 2: pp. 24-25]. Cymrot groups marines into twenty-two skill families, and uses the
one year difference between the military pay and civilian pay potential, along with vari-
ables to measure the bonus level, the unemployment rate, and the current rank of the
soldier.
The ACOL model holds a great deal of potential for predicting reenlistment rates.
However for reasons of scope and data availability, it is not fully incorporated into this
study. Instead, variables that measure the first year difference between civilian and
military wages are included in this study, in a manner similar to the Cymrot study ap-
proach.
This brief review of the literature services to further motivate the research questions




One of the shortcomings of many previous reenlistment studies is that they fail to
consider a broad range of variables which may explain reenlistment behavior. For ex-
ample, the 19S2 Concepts Analysis Agency study examines only three explanatory vari-
ables; the bonus level, the inflation rate, and the unemployment rate [Ref. 7: p. 4-10].
One of the goals of this study is to examine a full range of potential, quantifiable ex-
planatory variables.
The purpose of this chapter is to describe the selection of variables and the devel-
opment of the data base. A conceptual framework is developed to give focus and di-
rection to the data gathering effort. At this point, it is not important to assess the
potential significance of any particular variable, or to establish relationships between
them; instead it is sufficient to create a list of promising variables. In Chapter V, ex-
ploratory data analysis techniques determine which variables to include in the regression
equations. Seven variables are included in the regression model.
This chapter focuses primarily on the conceptual framework for the Zone A
reenlistment decision.
1. Source of Data
Data for this project comes primarily from the Defense Manpower Data Center
(DM DC), in Monterey. California. The mission of this organization is to archive man-
power data from all services for use in studies such as this. The Army gain loss file is the
primary source of data for the project. Other data includes economic variables from
sources such as the Bureau of Labor Statistics.
The data available from DMDC are records of soldiers actually making
reenlistment decisions. Individual-level records are chosen for the analysis rather than
group-level data because the later provides only limited insight into which variables in-
fluence soldier retention. To study the determinants of reenlistment behavior, data on
individuals themselves are most appropriate [Ref. 13: p. 3]. However, the analysis of




The response variable for the study is binomial: either the soldier chooses to
reenlist in his or her MOS or not. Some studies model the reenlistmcnt decision-making
process as a multinomial choice of reenlistment, extension, or leave the service. Ap-
pendix B addresses the issue of why a binomial response variable is chosen over a
multinomial response variable.
3. Explanatory Variables
This study includes a variable in the data base if it is quantifiable and if there
is some indication (hypothesized or in previous literature) that this factor explains the
reenlistment decision-making process. 13 The ideal variable is one that is also predictable
in the future [Ref. 14: p. 20]. In those cases where a primary variable is not quantifiable,
the study develops surrogate variables. For example, it is difficult to quantify the suc-
cess of a soldier. This study uses the rank the soldier achieves and the speed with which
he achieves it as surrogates for military success.
4. Survey Data
Survey data is not included in the data set. Unfortunately, this c minates the
only way to measure a considerable number of reenlistment factors, especially those
concerning soldier attitudes towards their jobs, and living conditions. However the
problems with survey data are twofold. First, it is impossible to match survey data with
the individual records. Second, although some past surveys are available, the survey
effort falls considerably short of the scope of the individual data gathering effort. Survey
data, and the studies that analyze it. assist in providing the insight necessary to choose
variables for this study. However, survey data is not available to measure those vari-
ables.
5. Time Period Covered
The data base covers the period from the fourth quarter. FYSO thru the first
quarter, FY89, 34 quarters of data in all. Data obtained before 19S0 are not included
for practical reasons. Prior to that date, DMDC stored data in the gain loss file in a
different format than is used at present. Conversion of that data is an expensive, time
consuming process, which is not justified for this project. 14
13 If a variable explains the reenlistment decision-making process it means that it reduces the
uncertainty of prediction of reenlistment rates.
14 One advantage to including more data (prior to 1980) in the study is to improve the range
of values of the explanatory variables. How ever, analysis shows that all variables have a good range
of values, and only modest improvement is achievable by including values from 1974-1979. A
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6. Size of Data Set
The data set contains the records of over 500,000 Zone A soldiers making their
reenlistment decisions. The study breaks the data into two groups, one group of data
for analysis and development of the regression models, and the second group of data for
validation. Numerous previous studies have neglected the validation process; the latter
step is a requirement for lending credibility to any predictive model.
B. CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK
We hypothesize that the reenlistment decision-making process of a soldier consid-
ering reenlisting for the first time depends on the following four factors.
• The soldier's initial motivation for military service.
• The soldier's success in the military and satisfaction with military life.
• The soldier's evaluation of the potential for success outside the military.
• The influence of Army reenlistment policies on the soldier's initial decision to stay
or leave.
First some comments on the specifics of this framework.
1. Initial Motivation for Military Service
Previous research supports the hypothesis that initial enlistment motivation in-
fluences a soldier's first term reenlistment behavior. l> For example, an Air Torce study
of first-term reenlistment intentions of avionics technicians lists career intentions at the
time of enlistment as the most important factor contributing to the technician's
reenlistment plans [Ref. 15: p. vii] . Of course the difficulty is measuring enlistment mo-
tivation. The most direct way is to survey soldiers; however, historical survey data is
not available. Instead, this study uses the following variables to gain insight into
enlistment motivation.
• Army College Fund Program Participation (ACF)
• Enlistment Bonus
• Enlistment Term
• Enlistment Program Training Program
• Ace at Enlistment
second reason not to include data prior to 1980 is relationships between explanatory variables and
dependent variable may change over time; emphasis is best placed on the more recent history.
15 The terms Zone A and first term are interchangeable in this study. Both refer to soldiers









Unemployment Rate at Time of Enlistment
The study uses these variables to determine whether a soldier is job, training or
education-motivated. While these variables do not directly measure a soldiers enlistment
motivation, they give insight into it, which in turn helps predict the soldiers reenlistment
propensity,
Appendix C gives a detailed discussion of each of these variables.
2. Success in the Service and Satisfaction with Military Life
The soldier's motivation for entering the service determines his or her initial
reenlistment propensity. However, the success the soldier achieves in the first term, and
his or her satisfaction with military life, profoundly effects this initial reenlistment pro-
pensity. As before, there are problems with directly measuring these factors. Eor ex-
ample the military uses items such as enlisted evaluation reports, skill qualification tests,
awards, and promotions rates to measure a soldiers success. Of these, only promotion
rate information is available for use in this study. However, at least numerous studies
support using promotion rates as a measure of success in the military. In one study by
Ward [Ref. 16: p. v] promotion speed relative to that of peers is the only indicator of a
high level of achievement. Two studies go further and try to predict promotion rates
using intelligence and educational scores. Although the results of these studies are not
consistent nor particularly strong, this study includes intelligence and educational vari-
ables [Ref. 16: pp. 1-3] [Ref. 17: p. 14].
Measuring a soldier's satisfaction with military life is also difficult. However
numerous studies find that quality of life issues appear to have little effect on the first
term reenlistment decision, although the impact of these factors increase dramatically in
importance thereafter. For example, one study uses survey data to show that although
military families do not like separations, they do not leave the service because of them
[Ref. IS: p. 27]. Supporting this is a study which finds the effects of factors such as
family separations are not significant in the first term reenlistment model [Ref. 8: p. 25].
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Two studies by the Navy Personnel Research and Development Center find that quality
of life issues are not statistically significant predictors of first term reenlistment intent
[Ref. IS: p. vii] [Ref. 19: p. vi]. One quality-of-life issue that has some significance is first
term duty location. One researcher finds that soldiers stationed overseas during their
first-term have reenlistment rates higher then those stationed in the continental United
States [Ref. 8: p. 23].











Dependent Status at Reenlistment
Change in Dependent Status
Appendix D discusses each of these variable in more depth and provides further
motivation for including them in the analysis.
3. Evaluation of Potential in the Civilian Sector
We are developing a conceptual framework to explain the reenlistment
decision-making process of soldiers. The framework starts by looking at the soldier's
initial enlistment motivation. This motivation (whether it is job, training or education)
gives the soldier an initial bias towards staying or leaving the service. The soldier's initial
bias is changed based on the success the soldier achieves in the first enlistment term and
his or her adjustment to military life. Many soldiers decide during the first term that the
Army is not for them, and they leave the service. However, we hypothesize that many
soldiers decide whether to stay or leave the service after making a comparison of their
military and civilian potential. The purpose of this section is to discuss the variables
associated with this comparison.
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An issue is whether soldiers can make meaningful evaluations of their potential
in the civilian sector. This study assumes they can. Secondary issues are: how can the
study measure the soldier's opportunities, and does the study's evaluation of a soldier's
potential match the soldier's evaluation of his or her potential?
There are a number of ways to measure the civilian opportunities available to
a soldier. One way is to look at the job category the soldier is in, and employment
growth of comparable civilian jobs. Another is to look at the civilian military wage in-
dex. These efforts are hampered due to incompatibility of numerous Army skills with
comparable civilian skills. Additionally, national economic indicators such as gross na-
tional product (GNP), consumer price index (CPI). and the unemployment rate to are
used to assess the civilian opportunities available to the soldier.
Finally, the study uses demographic variables as surrogates for the civilian ver-
sus military evaluation a soldier makes. Researchers note that women and black soldiers
recnlist at higher rates than white male soldiers. The researchers hypothesize that this
is due to women and blacks seeing insufficient job opportunities in the civilian sector,
as compared to military career options. Additionally, researchers hypothesize that
women and blacks see enhanced promotion opportunity in the military as compared to
the civilian sector. [Ref. 14: p. 29]
The study therefore uses the following variables to explain the soldier's evalu-






Civilian Military Wage Index
Consumer Price Index
Gross National Product
Percentage Growth Civilian Jobs
Appendix E describes each of the above variables in more depth and provides
further motivation for including them in the study.
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4. Reenlistment Policy Variables
After soldiers compare opportunities in the civilian sector to those in the mili-
tary, they make an initial reenlistment decision. However, the impact of Army
reenlistment policies can change this decision. For example, a soldier who initially de-
cides not to reenlist may change his mind in response to the oiler of a reenlistment cash
bonus. A soldier who initially wants to reenlist may change her mind because she is
unable to get the reenlistment option of the training or duty station she desires. Addi-
tionally, changes in reenlistment eligibility may make the soldier ineligible to reenlist.
The above are examples of the affects of reenlistment policy variables.
The Army is not able to directly manipulate all variables listed in this section.
For example, military pay and the retirement programs are policies that the Army can
only recommend to Congress. However, all the variables in this section are policy vari-
ables at some level in the government.
The study includes the following policy variable:
• Retirement System
• Number of Years to Military Retirement
• Real Military Compensation (RMC)
• RMC Adjusted by Inflation
• Bonus Payment
• Type of Bonus Payment
• Job Skill Migration
• Promotion Rate Forecast
• Reenlistment Eligibility Criteria
• Reenlistment System
Appendix F discusses each of these variables in more depth and the motivation
for including each of them in the analysis.
C. SIGNIFICANCE OF UNQUANTIFIABLE VARIABLES
Despite including over forty variables in this study, there are still numerous un-
quantifiable factors which may explain the reenlistment decision-making process. Those
related to satisfaction with military life near to have little effect on the Zone A deci-
sion. However this study also exclude ^b satisfaction variables, such as autonomy,
physical work environment, skill utilization, team effort, and relationships with peers,
subordinates and supervisors. This is unfortunate, because studies show job satisfaction
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is extremely important for the first term reenlistment model' 6 [Ref. 20; p. iii], Job sat-
isfaction variables are excluded because they are not measurable, except by survey, and
survey data is not available in sufficient detail to match the study's data set. Addi-
tionally, job satisfaction variables are difficult to predict (forecast) and therefore do not
lit well in the reenlistment model.
What is the significance of omitting variables such as job satisfaction? More unex-
plained variance may appear in the regression models, which leads to less precision and
confidence in the reenlistment response rates. We discuss these issues in more depth
later.
D. CLEANING THE DATA SET
Initial study indicates that the data set has a considerable amount of inaccurate
data. For example. Figure 3 shows the variable TERM OF ENLISTMENT. For this
variable. 6.1% of the entries are for zero or one years, or for more than four years, which
are invalid terms of enlistment.^ Analysis shows that invalid data rates range from
0-15% for most variables; however, seven of the variables have error rates of 15-25%. 18
Clearly there is a need to investigate the source of the data errors, and determine the
potential impact on the analysis. This investigation revealed that every7 entry for FY81
is in error for the seven variables with error rates of 15-25%. Discussions with DMDC
determined that the data File used in this study was a merging of two other data files, and
in the case of FY81, this merging was incorrectly performed. While DMDC is correcting
the problem for future use, the corrections were not available for use in this study.
Therefore, FYS1 data were excluded from further analysis.
DMDC referred us to the U. S. Total Army Personnel Command for an explanation
of the error rate of up to 15% on the remaining variables. The information systems
managers acknowledged that they had difficulty obtaining accurate data from Army or-
ganizations, and although they said efforts are underway to improve the quality of the
data, they offered few suggestions of how we could improve our data set.
Rather than discard all records with invalid data, an attempt was made to clean the
data set by cross referencing other data. An example is the variable TERM OF
16 However, job satisfaction decreases in importance in the second term.
1
7
Inaccurate data are determined by consulting the appropriate Army Regulation for the ac-
ceptable ranges of entries.
18 There is no missing data in the data set.
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TERM FREQUENCY PERCENT FREQUENCY PERCENT
4405 5.8 4405 5.8
1 36 0.0 4441 5.9
2 5760 7.6 10201 13.5
3 42853 56.6 53054 70.0
4 22577 29.8 75631 99.8
> 5 147 0.2 75778 100.0
Figure 3. Frequency Counts for the Variable Term of Enlistment. LIncleaned
TERM OF ENLISTMENT values of zero and one year are not valid, nor are values
of greater than four years. The study corrects for this by examining enlistment dates and
reenlistment dates and inferring from this the enlistment term. Following cleaning, the
variable TERM OF ENLISTMENT has the distribution of Figure 4.
TERM OF ENLISTMENT
CUMULATIVE
TERM FREQUENCY PERCENT FREQUENCY PERCENT
2 6291 8.3 6291 8.3
3 44784 59.1 51075 67.4
4 24703 32.6 75778 100.0
Figure 4. Frequency Counts for the Variable Term of Enlistment, Cleaned
Using procedures such as described above, much of the invalid data was corrected.
Appendix G lists the amount remaining by variable. Error rates range from 0-7.8%,
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with numerous variables having less than 1% invalid data. As a part of the cleaning
process. all remaining invalid data were recoded as missing data.
The question is whether the amount of missing data listed in Appendix G are ac-
ceptable, or if additional cleaning is necessary. The SAS statistical procedures of this
study exclude observations with missing values from further analysis [Ref. 21: p. 550].
Therefore, missing values are of concern if they constitute a high percentage of the ob-
servations in the multidimensional analysis, or if the missing values are not randomly
distributed throughout the observations. 19 However, our analysis shows that the amount
of remaining missing data is reasonable, and that the missing data does not change the
results of our analysis. Appendix G show the results of the statistical procedures that
show these results. Therefore, no further cleaning of the data set is done. Continuous
variables are cleaned in a similar manner.
19 An example of non-randomly distributed missing values is the seven incorrectly coded




The purpose of this chapter is to motivate the new methodology for predicting
reenlistment rates.
B. MOTIVATION FOR THE METHODOLOGY
1. Problems With Current Solution
The purpose of this study is to predict reenlistment rates for each of the Army's
350 military occupation specialities (MOS). However, it is impractical to do a separate
regression on each of the different MOS's for a number of reasons. These reasons were
discussed in some detail in Chapter I. and are reviewed here.
• Many of the 350 MOS's (60-70%) have never (or infrequently) been assigned a
reenlistment bonus. Estimates of regression coefficients for those MOS's produce
misleading results, because of the inadequate range of bonus values.
• All soldiers in an MOS receive the same bonus level at the same time, and therefore
it is difficult to separate the effects of the bonus level from other explanatory vari-
ables.
• Bonus levels have a very high correlation from year to year within an MOS. which
degrades the accuracy of the regression results.
• There is evidence that MOS's do not represent homogenous groups of soldiers with
similar probabilities of reenlisting. Therefore, considerable variance is added to the
problem before the regression is conducted.
Numerous previous studies have addressed these problems by grouping MOS's
together, usually forming 10-20 groups of 10-50 MOS's. Grouping in this manner is
usually done by combining MOS's that have similar job characteristics. The Concepts
Analysis Agency study uses this approach [Ref 7: p. 4-21].
Forming groupings of MOS's in this manner solves the first three of the four
problems listed above. There are, however, two criticisms of this technique of grouping
MOS's. First, the groupings are formed on an intuitive basis, and no attempt is made
to quantitatively determine if the grouping is sensible. Second, the fourth problem listed
above (MOS's are not a homogeneous grouping of soldiers with similar probabilities of
reenlisting) is not solved. Clearly, if an MOS is not a grouping of soldiers with a similar
probabilities of reenlisting, then neither is a grouping of MOS's.
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A major theme of this thesis is analysis of a new technique of grouping soldiers.
The methodology looks for groupings of soldiers with similar probabilities of recnlisting,
independent of their military occupation specialities. Since the groups contain soldiers
of differing MOS's, they have robust bonus histories, and less correlation from year to
year. Potentially, this grouping technique solves all four of the problems listed above.
To more fully explain and motivate this solution, the assertion that an MOS is
not a collection of soldiers with similar probabilities of reenlisting is now examined.
2. Non-homogenous MOS
Previous research supports the assertion that an MOS is not a homogenous
grouping of soldiers with similar probabilities of reenlisting [Ref. 5: p. 4]. This section
provides examples to illustrate the point.
First the fact that an MOS has subgroups of soldiers with widely varying
reenlistment probabilities is demonstrated. As an example. Infantrymen (MOS 11B)
have a 3-4" o reenlistment rate over the past six years. However, when the MOS is par-
titioned into two categories by DEPENDENT STATUS (one category is single soldiers
without dependents, and the second category is married and single soldiers with depen-
dents)^ these two categories display widely varying reenlistment rates of up to 20%.
Figure 5 shows the example for Infantrymen (MOS 1 lBi.
This result is not unique. Figure 6 shows three other MOS's which also display
the same characteristic. Additionally. Figure 6 shows that all MOS's taken together also
display about a 20% dilference between the reenlistment rates for soldiers with and
without dependents. Although the actual rates diller some by MOS (there are many
different factors interacting in this simple example) the general trend holds.
There are other variables that have similar characteristics. For example, Figure
7 shows Infantrymen (MOS 1 1 B ) partitioned into categories by RACE.
-0 Dependents may be children, elderly parents or any other legal dependent
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REENLISTMENT RATES BY DEPENDENT STATUS
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REENLISTMENT RATES, BY DEPENDENT STATUS
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Figure 6. Reenlistment Rates for Differing MOS's by Dependent Status
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REENLISTMENT RATES BY RACE


























Figure 7. Reenlistment Rates for MOS 11B. Zone A by Race
Clearly, the different racial groups have differing reenlistment rates, by up to 15%.
There are main' other examples, some of which are summarized in Table 1. Percentages
are for all MOS s taken together, and do not necessarily include all categories.
Table I. REENLISTMENT RATES BY CATEGORY, FOUR VARIABLES
Term of Enlistment
2 Years 19%











From this simple example it is possible to see that an MOS is not a homogene-
ous grouping of soldiers with respect to reenlistment propensity. There are categories
of the MOS that display widely differing probabilities of reenlisting. These results are
seen in most MOS s analyzed.
Once we establish that the MOS is not a homogeneous grouping of soldiers with
similar reenlistment rates, we also want to show that different MOS's are comprised of
varying percentages of soldiers from the different categories. To illustrate this, a simple
example using Infantrymen (MOS 11B). L'nit Supply Specialist (MOS 76Y). and
Programmer Analyst (MOS 74F). and the variable race is provide.
Figure 8 below gives the percentage of each race that comprise the given MOS.
It is readily seen that the differing MOS's are not comprised of the same proportions of
the racial groups. Again this is a general result found with many variables and most
MOS s.
RACIAL COMPOSITION OF MOS'S










Figure 8. Racial Composition of Three MOS's
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The results to this point are as follows:
• MOS's are comprised of categories of soldiers with different probabilities of
reenlisting.
• Soldiers in a given category will display similar probabilities of reenlisting in many
different MOS's.
• MOS's are comprised of different proportions of the categories.
3. Example of Methodology
Using these observations, we can predict reenlistment rates for MOS's using a procedure
illustrated by the following trivial example.
Over the past six years, the reenlistment rate for Infantrymen (MOS 11B) aver-
aged 34%; for the Unit Supply Clerk (MOS 76Y) the rate averaged 46%. An explana-
tion for this difference is that MOS 76Y is comprised of higher proportions of soldiers
with higher probabilities of reenlistment. Table 2 provides the example.
Table 2. REENLISTMENT RATES COMPARISONS
Variable MOS 11B MOS 76Y Remarks
Sex 0% Female 21", Fe-
male
Females reenlist at a rate 19% higher
than males








Soldiers with dependents reenlist at a
rate 20% higher
Again, this trivial example explains the higher reenlistment rate of MOS 76Y by dem-
onstrating that it is comprised of higher proportions of soldiers who reenlist with higher
probabilities. This example provides the motivation for our approach.
4. Assumption of the Methodology
A significant assumption is made at this point. The method of this study forms
homogeneous groupings of soldiers by looking for similar probabilities of reenlisting.
We assume that soldiers with similar probabilities of reenlisting will display similar bo-
nus response rates. Work by one researcher supports this assumption. He shows that
soldiers exhibit similar bonus and pay response rates by demographic groups [Ref. 11:
p. 212],
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5. Motivation for Variable Reduction
There are 40 explanatory variables available to explain the reenlistment decision
making process of a soldiers. It is not practical to continue with a 40 dimensional
problem, and therefore part of the methodology is to reduce the number of variables.
The reasons why this is important are as follows:
• Including 40 variables would require the prediction of those 40 variables each time
the model is run.
• Including 40 explanatory variables increases the chance for collinearity within the
regression model, which reduces model performance.
• Including 40 explanatory variables (over 20 of which are categorical variables) will
require the estimation of over 100 coefficients. A regression equation of this size
lacks the parsimony necessary' of a good model.
• Most of the explainable variance in reenlistment response rates can be explained
with considerable fewer than 40 variables.
Therefore, variable reduction will be an important part of the solution method.
C. METHODOLOGY
As a result of the above discussion, this study adopts the following solution steps.
• Select influential categorical variables using log-linear models.
• Partition the population into cells with similar reenlistment probabilities.
• Reduce the number of cells using cluster analysis.
• Select influential continuous variables using logistic regression.
• Estimate reenlistment rates for each cell using logistic regression.
• Compute projected reenlistment rates for each MOS as a linear combination across
all cells.
The use of log-linear models for the categorical variables, and the logistic models for
the continuous variables is suggested since the study uses a binary response variable.
Influential variables are defined as variables that are likely to be statistically significant
predictors of reenlistment rates, and are identified through exploratory data analysis us-
ing log-linear and logistic models. The cluster analysis addresses the issue of sparse cells.
Cluster analysis, log-linear models and logistic regression are all discussed in more detail
in Chapter V, Appendix I and Appendix J.
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V. ZONE A ANALYSIS AND RESULTS
A. GENERAL
The purpose of this chapter is to demonstrate the application of the methodology
outlined in Chapter IV to the Zone A reenlistment problem.
B. SELECTION OF INFLUENTIAL CATEGORICAL VARIABLES
The first step is to select influential categorical variables, for use in partitioning the
Zone A population into cells of soldiers who have similar probabilities of reenlisting.
There are thirty categorical variables available to partition the population, with
some of the variables having ten to twenty categories. In the worst case, the problem
is partitioned into 8 x 1023 cells. Clearly this is an unmanageable number of cells.
The approach to reducing the number of variables is to use exploratory data analysis
techniques. In addition to reducing the number of variables, opportunities to reduce the
number of categories within a variable are also explored.
1. Exploratory Data Analysis of Categorical Variables.
This study uses a systematic approach of exploratory data analysis on the
categorical variables. It can best be described as a bottom up method. The approach
starts by first understanding the data through the study of the variable's distributions
and simple univariate procedures, and then increases dimensionality with bivariate and
multivariate techniques. This approach is advocated in the data analysis books such as
Chambers [Ref. 22: pp. 316-319],
One problem with this approach is that it is impractical to test a large percent-
age of the interactions of groupings of three or more variables. For example, to test all





Therefore, the study uses an approach outlined in Freeman and Jekel [Ref. 23:
pp. 514-519] to discover interesting multivariate groupings. Freeman and Jekel recog-
nize that the variables of potential interest may be hidden in a forbiddingly large cross-
classification scheme and that there is a tradeoff between trving to reduce the number
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of variables and the potential of losing valuable information. Therefore, they propose
the following procedure.
• Perform a test for independence between each pair of variables.
• If two variables are dependent, then form a compound variable using them.
Compound variables are formed by combining two variables together into a single
variable with categories corresponding to all combinations of categories of the
variables being combined.
• Perform a test for independence between these compound variables and all other
variables.
• Form new compound variables for each pair consisting of a compound variable and
a single variable that are dependent.
• Continue this process until cell frequencies becomes small (less than one.) At this
point, terminate the selection process, and choose the variables with the most sig-
nificant associations for inclusion in the reduced table.- 1 [Ref. 23: pp. 513-518]
The goal of this section is to produce a parsimonious model [Ref. 24: p. 156].
For reasons of readability, we do not present even.' test conducted within the paper.
Instead an example or two is presented to show the procedure, and than the results
summarized.
2. Exploratory Data Analysis Tools
There are two primary type models to use on categorical data. They are linear
models, as described by Grizzel. Starmer and Koch [Ref. 25: pp. 491-492] and log-linear
models, as described by Bishop. Fienberg and Holland [Ref. 26: pp. 28-37].
This study will primarily use the log-linear models for the study of categorical
variables. Log-linear models work especially well in analyzing contingency tables of
three or more dimensions [Ref. 27: p. 207] and are useful in testing hypotheses about the
nature of relationships between two or more categorical variables [Ref. 24: p. 143].
Appendix II gives the background of log-linear models.
3. Distribution of Variables
The first step in the systematic approach to data analysis is to study the dis-
tributions of the individual variables. Table 3 lists the thirty categorical variables, and
gives the range and type of measurement scale of the variable. The right column is ex-
plained below.
21 The procedure outlined does not guarantee selection of the best table, nor should it always
be followed rigorously. Instead in the spirit of exploratory data analysis, it is a rational, easily im-
plemented procedure to select an interesting table.
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Table 3. MEASUREMENT SCALE
VARIABLES
AND RANGES FOR CATEGORICAL





ACF O-S Nominal Yes
Enlistment Bonus 0-6 Nominal Yes
Enlistment Term 2-4 Ordinal Yes
Enlistment Program 1-21 Nominal No
Age at Enlistment 17-34 Interval No
Age at Separation 19-40 Interval No
Prior Service 0-6 Nominal Yes
Reserve Time 0-1 Nominal Yes
Youth Program 0-7 Nominal Yes
Hometown (Region) 0-10 Nominal No
Education at Enlistment 1-12 Ordinal Yes
Education at Reenlistment 1-12 Ordinal Yes
Change in Education o-l Nominal Yes
Dependent Status at Enlistment 10-29 Nominal Yes
Dependents at Reenlistment 10-29 Nominal Yes
Change in Dependents o-l Nominal Yes
Character of Service o-l Nominal Yes
Mental Test Category 1-8 Ordinal No
Years of Service 2-6 Interval No
Current Rank 1-6 Ordinal Yes
Duty Location 1-13 Nominal No
Race 1-3 Nominal Yes
Ethnic Group 1-6 Nominal Yes
Sex 1-2 Nominal Yes
Job Type 0-9 Nominal No
Retirement System 0-1 Nominal Yes
Number of Years to Military Retirement 2-20 Interval No
Type of Bonus Payment 1-2 Nominal Yes
Job Skill Migration 1-2 Nominal Yes
Reenlistment Bonus Multiplier 0-6 Interval Yes
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The most significant result of the study of individual distributions concerns the
number of observations in each category. Variables are of two types. One type, of
which the variables TERM OF ENLISTMENT and SEX are typical, have a large num-
ber of observations in one category. Figure 9 shows the uneven frequency distribution
of TERM OF ENLISTMENT and SEX. Table 3 has a Yes in the right column for
variables of this type.
FREQUENCY COUNTS
TERM OF EWJS-WES- SEX
JO. B
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Tigure 9. Frequency Counts For Selected MOS's
The second type variable, of which CIVILIAN OPPORTUNITY OF JOB
SKILL and REGION OF COUNTRY ENLISTED FROM are typical, have the bulk
of frequencies spread over many values. Figure 9 shows the larger number of categories
with a significant number of observations for the variables CIVILIAN OPPORTUNITY
OF JOB SKILL and REGION OF COUNTRY ENLISTED FROM. These variables
have a No in the right column of Table 3.
When the population is partitioned using variables that have a large number of
observations in one catecorv (and therefore other categories with extremely small num-
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ber of observations), this causes a large number of sparse cells. The issue of sparse cells
is addressed in great length later in the study; however, it is important to understand the
causes of those sparse cells.
4. Univariate Analysis
The first result of univariate analysis concerns variables having interval meas-
urement scales. Figure 10 shows the reenlistment rates for the categorical variable AGE
AT ENLISTMENT, an example of a variable with an interval measurement scale.
Clearly the older soldiers are, the higher their probability of reenlisting. However, the
variance increases significantly as age increases, due to the decreasing number of obser-
vations.
REENLISTMENT RATES









Figure 10. Reenlistment Rates for all MOS's, by Age at Enlistment
AGE AT ENLISTMENT is one of the interval variables that can be treated
either as a categorical variable or as a continuous variable. Although it could recoded
into fewer categories, it is not intuitive to do so, because of the generally increasing
probability to reenlist as age increases. Additionally, because the bulk of the observa-
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tions are in the left tail, numerous sparse cells result. Analysis such as this leads us to
drop the following variables from consideration as categorical variables. They will be
reconsidered as continuous variables.
• Age at Enlistment
• Age at Separation
• Years of Service
• Number of Years to Military Retirement
• Reenlistment Bonus Multiplier
There are numerous variables in which hypothesized relationships are not vali-









Some of these variables are rejected due to data problems. For example.
EiNLISTiMENT BONUS has far fewer number of soldiers coded as receiving a
reenlistment bonus then are known to have received them. Some of the variables are
dropped because there is no significant difference in the reenlistment probabilities for
different categories. For example, ENLISTMENT PROGRAM is dropped for this rea-
son. Finally, some variables are discarded because of interactions with other factors.
For example. DUTY LOCATION is discarded because analysis shows reenlistment rates
of over 95% for soldiers stationed overseas. However, further analysis shows that sol-
diers who near the end their term of service overseas are brought back from overseas
prior to their discharge, while reenlisting soldiers remain overseas. If not corrected for,
this leads to a biased assessment of the effect of DUTY LOCATION on the reenlistment
rate.
The final univariate analysis result involves reduction in the number of catego-
ries in certain variables. Figure 11 shows whv MENTAL CATEGORIES are recoded
36
from seven categories to four categories. Categories 2-5 have statistically similar




















Figure 11. Reenlistment Rates by Mental Category and by Rank
Figure 1 1 shows how the variable CURRENT RANK is recoded as three
groupings, even though there clearly appear to be four distinct groupings. However,
when the frequency numbers are examined, the E6 category contains less than 200 of the
75.7SS observations. Since the E6 category is not statistically different from the E5
category, they are combined without loss of precision.
Analysis shows significant differences in reenlistment rates by home state.
Clearly, however, including the fifty state categories is impossible. Since, there appear
to be regional trends, the first step is to categorize the states into the nine standard
United States regions. While categorization into these regions is a good first step, there
are still some inconsistencies, and the number of categories is still too great. Therefore,
the states are further categorized into five regions. Figure 12 shows the reenlistment
rates for those five regions. Analvsis shows that these categories are stable over time.
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Similarly, the Army's 350 military job specialities are grouped into three general cate-
gories, which is our subjective evaluation of the civilian opportunities available to sol-
diers with different job skills.
REENLISTMENT RATES
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NORTHEAST MID-ATL SOUTH MID-WEST WEST
Figure 12. Reenlistment Rates for Regions of the Country
At the end of the univariate analysis, 17 variables remain. All have between two
and five categories.
5. Multivariate Analysis
One of the purposes of the multivariate analysis is to choose between groups of variables
that are clearly collinear. The first of these groups are the variables which measure ed-
ucation levels.
• Education at Enlistment
• Education at Reenlistment
• Change in Education
The second group measures dependent status.
• Dependent Status at Enlistment
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• Dependent Statue at Reenlistment
• Change in Dependent Status
The third group measures race and ethnic groups.
• Race
• Ethnic Group
The analysis confirms the dependence between the variables, and gives guidance
as to the best variables to select. The variables are:
• Education at Reenlistment
• Dependent Statue at Reenlistment
• Ethnic Group
As a result of this analysis. 12 categorical variables are retained. These 12 are
listed in Table 4. along with their final categories.
Table 4. REMAINING CATEGORICAL VARIABLES





ACT o-l Nominal C
Enlistment I erm T_1 Ordinal T
Prior Service 0-1 Nominal P
1 lometown (Region) 1 -5 Nominal 11
Education at Enlistment 1 - j Ordinal E
Dependents at Reenlistment j.-) Nominal D
Character of Service o-l Nominal X
Mental "lest Category- 5-8 Ordinal \1
Current Rank 3-5 Ordinal G
Race 1-3 Nominal R
Sex i _ -> Nominal S
.lob Type 1 -3 Nominal J
6. Table Selection
To further reduce the number of variables, the procedure (described on page 32)
by Freeman and Jekel [Ref. 23: pp. 514-519] is applied to the remaining 12 variable. The
first step in selecting the multi-dimensional table is to examine the dependence of all
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pairs of variables. The analysis of the dependence uses Cramer's test [Ref. 23: pp.
514-519] as a measure of association. The significant pairs of variables are TD GR SR
RI I and JE. This first table is not displayed due to its size, however it is constructed
similar to 'fable 5 below.
The second step in selecting the multi-dimensional table is to form a compound
variable from each dependent pair of variables as described on page 32. and then test the
dependence of the compound variables with all remaining variables [Ref. 23: p. 517].
Table 5 shows the results.
Table 5. ASSOCIATIONS WITH COMPOUND VARIABLES
Variables TD GR SR RH JE




1 1-1 lometown (Region) 5 X
E-Education at Enlistment 3
D-Dependents at Reenlistment 2
X-Character of Service 2
M -Mental Test Category 4
G-Current Rank -> X
R-Race ") X
S-Sex *>
J -Job Type j X
Significant tables are TDG, SRJ, JER, and I1GR. Continuing on in this manner
leads to the following results.
7. Results of Exploratory Data Analysis
As a result of the exploratory data analysis, the following variables are used to












Job Type (3 categories)
C. PARTITIONING OF THE POPULATION INTO HOMOGENEOUS CELLS
The purpose of this step is to partition the population into homogeneous cells con-
taining soldiers with similar probabilities of reenlisting. The variables are the influential
categorical selected in the above step.
Using the seven categorical variables with between two and live categories each to
partition the population creates a total of 1080 cells. A random sample of 75,788 Zone
A soldiers shows that 859 of the cells have non-zero frequencies, 162 over 100 observa-
tions, and 12 over 1000 observations.
Clearly, this is too many cells. Additionally, the sparse cells (those approximately
55o cells with under 25 observations) do not perform well in regression. Therefore, fur-
ther reduction of the number of cells must occur.
D. CELL REDUCTION
1. Cell Reduction Procedure
There is considerable literature concerning cell reduction of multidimensional
contingency tables. These studies identify three primary ways to reduce multidimen-
sional tables (Ref. 2S: p. 546] [Ref. 29: pp. 328-329]. These three methods are:
• Reduce the Number of Variables
• Reduce the Number of Categories in a Variable
• Combine Cells Within the Multidimensional Contingency Table
Of these three techniques, the first two are fully exploited in previous sections.
Analysis shows that further reduction using these techniques results in significant loss
of information. Therefore, we turn to techniques to combine cells within the multidi-
mensional table to further reduce the number of cells.
Combining cells within the multidimensional table using cluster analysis is the
technique used in a thesis by Larsen [Ref. 30: pp. 22-34]. The problem he solves is esti-
mating retention rates for Marine Corps officers. He partitions his population into cells
using years of service, job speciality, and source of commission. Similarly to this thesis,
he ends up with many sparse cells, and combines them using cluster analysis.
While this study does not use the computerized cluster analysis techniques of
the Larsen study, the ad-hoc procedure used follows the same principles. The primary
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reason for not using the computer package is the existence of special structure in the
problem, which is not fully exploited by the package.
The special structure in this problem is the existence of a subset of variables
which have a large percentage of the observations in one category, and therefore other
categories with few observations. An example of this is the variable SEX, which has less
then 8% woman. An extremely large proportion of the cells that have this category
associated with it are sparse cells.
The second part of the special structure is that the variables having the large
percentage of the observations in one category also have the most significant differences
in probabilities to reenlist between cells. For example, in the case of the variable SEX.
the category WOMEN is a relatively homogeneous grouping, requiring little further
categorization. The ad-hoc procedure of this study exploits this structure to combine








This ordering examines those variables with the largest percentage of large cat-
egories first.
2. Cell Reduction Results
Using the ad-hoc cluster analysis procedure reduces the number of cells from
1080 to 92. All cells have at least 37 observations (from a random sample of 75778 ob-
servations). Only five of the cells have under 100 observations, and 24 of the cells have
over 1000 observations.
Although variable reduction is proceeding, there are still too many cells.
Therefore cells are further combined, this time by grouping cells with similar
reenlistment probabilities. Cells are grouped only if they fall into a three percentage
point window. Attempts are made to group like cells; this goal is slightly relaxed to fa-
cilitate groupings.
36 cells result from the second iteration of cell reduction. Reenlistment rates
varv from 7% to 80° o within these cells. The smallest cell has 232 observations from a
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75778 observation sample, and 20 of the 36 have over 1000 observations. Appendix J
lists the composition of each of the 36 cells, and the reenlistment rates for each group.
E. SELECTION OF INFLUENTIAL CONTINUOUS VARIABLES
1. Exploratory Data Analysis of Continuous Variables
The purpose of this section is to select the influential continuous variables for
inclusion in the regression equations. The technique is exploratory data analysis, using
a bottom up approach as described earlier in this chapter. The primary tool is logistic
regression. Appendix I describes these techniques in detail.
The section begins with 20 potential variables. The goal is to choose five to
seven for inclusion in the regression equations.
Since the reenlistment population is partitioned into 36 different cells, this
analysis could be preformed separately for each cell. However, this entails a prohibitive
amount of work. Instead the exploratory data analysis is performed on the entire pop-
ulation. This is compensated for by the separate stepwise regression on each cell.
A general observation of the exploratory data analysis is that although there are
significant relationships between many of the explanatory variables and the response
variable, few of the variables account for a large portion of the variance in reenlistment
probabilities. This result lowers considerably the expectations for the amount of the
variance the overall model explains.
2. Distribution of Individual Variables
The purpose of this section is to examine the distribution of the continuous
variables. The logistic regression model requires no specific distributional assumptions
(for example normality). However, the regression model gives inaccurate estimates if the
variables do not have sufficient range and spread. Table 6 shows the range, mean, and
standard deviation for the continuous variables. All the variables have adequate range
and spread. A second issue is the scale of the variables in relationship to each other.
Regression techniques often do not perform well if the variables are widely scaled. The
scales in this case are moderate, and a well-behaved model is anticipated.
3. Univariate Analysis
The primary purpose of the univariate analysis is to select the influential vari-
ables for inclusion in the regression equations.
Figure 13 gives the results of a logistic regression to test the significance of the
variable BONUS LEVEL on the probability of reenlisting. using the SAS LOG1ST
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Table 6. RANGES. MEANS AND STANDARD DEVIATIONS FOR CONTIN-
UOUS VARIABLES




Unemployment Rate at Enlistment 2.4. 18 7.75 2.33
Unemployment Rate at Reenlistment 2.4. IS 7.81 2.39
Promotion Rates -38, 95.5 -o.lS 7.31
AFQT Score 0, 99 49.89 23.38
Age at Enlistment 17-34 19.65 2.59
Age at Separation 19-40 22. SS 2.73
Consumer Price Index 1.1. 8.9 3.73 1.36
Gross National Product 0.037. 0.117 0.070 0.020
Years of Service 2. 6 3.87 0.78
Number of Years to Military Retirement 14. 18 16.13 0.78
Real Military Compensation 2. 12 4.36 2.93
Promotion Rate Forecast -38. 95.5 -o.lS 7.31
Reenlistment System 1. 5 2.81 1.35
Bonus Multiplier 0. 5 0.49 0.89
Real Military Compensation {Inflation
Adjusted)
2. 12 4.36 2.93
procedure. Of note are two items. First is the low R value. Appendix I discusses the
R value for logistic regression in detail; it is analogous to the R in ordinary least square
regression, which is a measure of the fit of the model. The second item of note is the p
value. This represents the following hypothesis test.
Hq. Coefficient Estimate is Zero
H
x
: Coefficient Estimate is Not Zero
(3)
(4)
The specific test is a Wald test for zero slope, and the test statistic is closely approxi-
mated by a Chi-square distribution [Ref. 31: p. 191]. The low p value in Figure 13 re-
presents a low probability that the variable BONUS has a slope of zero, and therefore
a low p ( < 0.05) represents the rejection of the null hypothesis, and strongly suggests
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MINIMUM MAXIMUM S. D.
0.88916
CONVERGENCE IN 15 ITERATIONS R= 0.060.
VARIABLE BETA STD . ERROR CHI-SQUARE
INTERCEPT -0.576 0.0087 4349.01
BONUS 0.158 0.0084 354.48
0.001
0.001 0.060
Figure 13. Regression of Bonus Level vs Reenlistment Probability
The above example has an estimation of the intercept term of -0.576 and a slope
of 0.158 for the variable BONUS LEVEL. These, however, are the transformed inter-
cepts (see Appendix I for a full explanation). To get the actual reenlistment probability
at a given bonus level Equation 5 is used, where a and /? arc the intercept and slope





A plot of this function is in Figure 14.
REENLISTMENT RATE















Figure 14. Plot of Bonus Level vs Reenlistment Probability
A second purpose of the univariate analysis is to "fine tune" the variables. An
example of this is to plot the unemployment rate just prior to a soldiers reenlistment
date, and also lagged by two months, then six months and nine months, and see which
is most influential on the reenlistment probability. The issue is much more complicated
than this however, because there are issues of which unemployment rates to choose (for
the entire population or for certain age groups), whether to choose local regional or
national rates, and whether to choose unadjusted or seasonally adjusted rates. Clearly
this level of detail is beyond the scope of this thesis: whole studies have addressed just
the one issue of which unemployment rate to use. Some limited work is done on the
continuous variables; however, for the most part we have relied on the literature to point
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the way in choosing continuous variables. The limited results achieved in this analysis
are incorporated in Chapter 111.
4. Bivariate and Multivariate Analysis
One major issue of this analysis is collinearity. When variables included in the
regression are collinear or linear combinations of each other, they reduce the precision
of the coefficient estimates. There is significant potential for collinearity in the esti-
mation of reenlistment rates. The reason is that longer soldiers remain in the service, the
higher their probability of reenlistment becomes. Therefore, any variable that increases
as a function of a soldier's time in the service shows a positive correlation with the
reenlistment probability. Examples of these variables are many. Rank increases with a
soldier's increasing time in service, and pay amount is a function of rank and time in the
service. Generally the number of dependents a soldier has increases with service, as does
his education level, and his age. A soldier's initial term of service is positively correlated
with his time in service. These are all examples of potentially collinear variables, which
may adversely alTect the precision of the coefficient estimates. Therefore, extreme care
is taken to ensure that variables that are collinear are not included.
1 o test for collinearity. regressions are performed on pairs of potentially
collinear variables. If the variables display a high R value, then they are highly collinear.
and one of the variables is not included in the regression model. Tor example, the two
variables, AGE AT ENLISTMENT and AGE AT SEPARATION are potentially
collinear. A regression of these variables has an R value of 0.9229. This high R value
is the first clue of the collinearity of these variables. If collinear variables are included,
the regression model will indicate a better model fit than is justified by the data. A full
explanation of collinearity, and its effects on regression models is found in Mosteller and
Tukev [Ref. 32: pp. 280-284],
5. Results of Exploratory Data Analysis
As a result of the exploratory data analysis of the continuous variables, the
study includes the following variables in the regression models:







• Age at Entry
F. ESTIMATION OF REENLISTMENT RATES
A stepwise logistie regression is performed on each of the 36 cells, using the proce-
dures outlined in Appendix I. Appendix K contains a table of results. The table con-
tains the estimated coefficients, plus the R value for each regression. Additionally
Appendix K gives the results of the hypothesis test to see if the coefficient is statistically
different from zero.
Equation 6 below gives a example of the bonus equations for one of the cells, Cell
i~
. . 1.09 - 0.209 xBonus + 0.012 xAFQT + 0.057 x Age ai Entry *'
1 + e
Analysis of the results in Appendix K leads to the following observations:
• The R values for all the regression equations are low. This was expected, as the
estimation of reenlistment rates is a difficult problem. This is because many factors
play into a soldiers decision to reenlist; we can only hope to capture some of those
reasons with measurable variables.
• Although the R values are small, the explanatory variables included have low p
values, indicating that the slope of the estimated coefficient is significantly different
than zero.
• There are some cells for which the bonus level did not significantly influence the
reenlistment rate.
G. COMPUTATION OF MOS REENLISTMENT RATES
'I he final step to the procedure is to calculate the reenlistment rate for the MOS. as
a linear combination across all the cells. To illustrate how this is done, an example is
provided.
In this example, the reenlistment rates for MOS 1 1 B (Infantryman) are computed
for 1990. The following information is estimated for next year.
• The unemployment rate will be 5.0° o.
• MOS HB's promotion rate average will be higher than other MOS's, so that the
average 1 IB soldier is promoted six months sooner than the average.
The AFQT average score will be 63.
The pay raise for next year will be 3.2%
• The reenlistment system will remain liberal
• Additionally, the average 11B soldier eligible to reenlist next year was 19 years old
when he enlisted.
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Figure 15 gives the projected breakdown, by cell, of MOS 11B for soldiers eligible to
reenlist next year. Computing the reenlistment rate for MOS 11B gives the results in
Table 7.
Table 7. REENLISTMENT RATES FOR MOS 1 IB








Since the data set was partitioned prior to the beginning of the analysis, cross-
validation of the regression models is possible using the remaining data.
The cross-validation is conducted on the 36. rather than on the 350 MOS's. Table
8 shows the results of a randomly selected number of the cells. The first column shows
the estimated reenlistment rates for the cell over the past six years. The second column
has the actual reenlistment rates. The excellent fit of the model is seen just by compar-
ing these two columns. The fit is confirmed through use of a chi-square goodness-of-fit
test. The procedure followed is the same as described in Appendix J. The model is re-
jected at the a = O.05 level, if the test statistic is greater than 3.841. Clearly, these result
confirm the validity of the regression models.
A second part of the model validation is to check the residuals of the regression
model. There are no indications of problems with the residuals. Appendix I discusses
the form of the logistic regression residuals.
I. MODEL PRECISION
The military reenlistment bonus model is a deterministic model which optimizes es-
timated means, and requires point estimates of reenlistment rates. However, we feel
obligated to discuss confidence intervals on those point estimates. We recommend the
that the users of the military reenlistment bonus model conduct sensitivity analysis, by
varying reenlistment rates in order to understand how the estimate impacts on their de-
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cisions. The confidence intervals provide guidance on the reenlistment rate values that
should be used for worst and best case estimates.








Cell 1 30.5% 31.3% + 0.8% 0.27
Cell 2 24.2% 25.1% + 0.9%, 0.42
Cell 7 27.3% 24.3% -3.0% 1.88
Cell 12 48.6% 45.3° o -3.3% 1.97
Cell 22 36.4% 37.1% + 0.7% 0.3S
Cell 24 40.3% 38.4% -1.9% 1.71
Cell 43 61.4% 58.5% -2.9% 0.80
(ell 4~ 40.8% 43.5% + 2.7% 1.38
The military reenlistment bonus model does not accept confidence intervals as model
inputs. Therefore, instead of generating a table of 350 MOS confidence intervals that
would not be used, we instead provide a general rule of thumb to guide the selection of
values for sensitivity analysis. Generally, the predicted rate + - 10% gives a 70% con-
fidence interval, the predicted rate +/- 15% gives a 95% confidence interval. These
worst case estimates also attempt to account for additional error that results from inac-




CELL NUMBER PERCENT NUMBER PERCENT
1 107 1.6 107 1.6
35 0.5 142
3 610 9.3 752 11.5
5 36 0.5 788 12.0
6 390 5.9 1178 18.0
7 21 0.3 1199 IS.
3
8 9 0.1 120S 18.4
22 304 4.6 1512 23.1
24 223 3.4 1735 26.5
26 716 10.9 2451 37.4
28 437 6.7 2888 44.0
31 230 3.5 3118 47.6
37 93 1.4 3211 49.0
38 137 2.1 3348 51.1
39 6 0.1 3354 51.2
4] 52 0.8 3406 51.9
46 983 15.0 43S9 66.9
4 l ) 90 1.4 4479 68.3
51 75 1.1 4554 69.5
52 131 2.0 4685 71.5
58 98 1.5 4783 72.9
63 177 2.7 4960 75.6
66 228 3.5 5188 79.1
72 8 0.1 5196 79.2
73 1118 17.1 6314 96.3
76 243 3.7 6557 100.0




This study develops a methodology for estimating reenlistment rates for use in the
military reenlistment bonus model. It departs significantly from methods of previous
studies in that it does not group MOS's into skill families or other similar groupings.
Instead this study looks for homogeneous groupings of soldiers with similar probabilities
of reenlisting, and develops regression models for these groupings.
There is strong statistical evidence that certain groups of soldiers have very different
reenlistment propensities. These groupings are best defined by categorical variables.
which partition the population into cells of soldiers who are homogeneous with respect
to their reenlistment probability. This study assumes that these groups are also homo-
geneous with respect to their response to changes in bonus levels. There is some prior
research to support this assumption [Ref 11: p. 212].
Many researchers include one or two categorical variables in their regression
equations. Few. however, exploit the full potential of these variables. Including more
categorical variables leads to many cells with low expected frequencies.
To overcome the low expected frequencies, this study first partitions the population
into cells and then groups cells. The grouping procedure uses the principles of cluster
analysis to take advantage of special problem structure by finding the variables most
likely to create low expected frequency cells. "I he resulting grouped cells contain soldiers
with nearly the same statistical reenlistment probabilities. Regression models are devel-
oped for each grouping of cells, and MOS reenlistment rates as a function of bonus level
are calculated as a linear combination across the cells.
Most of the regression equations had low R 2 values. These low R 2 do not invalidate
the model for several reasons. First, the grouping of the cells by clustering is a
variance-reduction step. The R 2 for the regression models indicate the amount of vari-
ance within the groups that is explained. Since the grouping of cells reduces the variance
within a cell, the potential for further reduction is limited. Second, while the R : is low,
the variables included in the regression models are statistically significant. Third, the
study is hampered by the quality of the national economic variables. Variables such as
GNP, UNEMPLOYMENT RATE and CIVILIAN JOB GROWTH are quantified at
an aggregated level. Finer resolution data (by quarter and by geographic location)
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would help further explain variance. Fourth, the low R 2 value is not unexpected in this
type of problem. This study tries to explain a soldier's recnlistment propensity using
nationally measurable variables. However surveys of soldiers show that the reenlistment
decision making process is complex, involving issues as complex (and unmeasurable) as
a soldiers relationship with his peers, and his job satisfaction. Given this, it is not sur-
prising that the R 2 is low. Finally, despite the low R 2 . the models are validated using
cross-validation. This cross-validation finds the models to be a highly predictive, credi-
ble models of significant value.
A noteworthy finding of this study is that the variable BONUS LEVEL is not sig-
nificant in numerous cells. In other words, soldiers in these cells do not respond to in-
creasing cash bonuses. Obviously bonuses should not be allocated to MOS's with high
percentages of soldiers from these cells.
One of the difficulties of this study is the inability to quantitatively measure items
such as the effectiveness of the reenlistment system in providing soldiers with their de-
sired reenlistment option. However, the results of the subjective variable
REENLISTMENT SYSTEM are extremely interesting. This variable measures how
"liberal" the reenlistment system is in providing soldiers their reenlistment options. It is
significant in as many equations as is the bonus level. The most recent improvement in
this area is a program called the Commander's Override, in which the computerized
reenlistment system is manually overriden to keep a soldier in the service by providing
his or her reenlistment option choice. Clearly programs such as these are an alternatives
to the cash reenlistment bonus.
Another finding is the significance of the variables to measure a soldier's motivation
to join the service. These enlistment variables are important in determining the first term
reenlistment model. Among these variables are TERM OF ENLISTMENT. SEX.
RACE, REGION. JOB TYPE and AFQT PERCENT. Since many of the enlistment
variables are significant in the Zone A reenlistment model, further study of other
enlistment variables is in order. There is an enlistment data base which was not available
for this study that contains numerous variables of potential interest. Since enlistment
demographics appear significant to the first-term reenlistment decision, then one way to
improve first-term reenlistments is to target for enlistment those groups of soldiers who
display the highest reenlistment propensities.
A finding of this study is that the potentially complicating issues of MOS mi-
grations, extensions and reenlistment windows can be ignored, with onlv minor loss of
53
accuracy in the reenlistment estimates. This greatly simplifies the reenlistment model.
Appendix B discusses this issue in detail.
This study developed a alternative technique to previous methods of grouping
MOS's. This method was cross-validated with data not used in the model development
of the model. The results are highly predictive of reenlistment rates, and responses to
bonuses.
B. RECOMMENDATIONS
The estimates of Zone A reenlistment rates developed in this study should be
adopted for use in the military reenlistment bonus model.
The procedures outlined in this study should be replicated to estimate the Zone B
and Zone C reenlistment rates.
C. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER STUDY
• This study does not analyze the composition of the grouped cells to any great ex-
tent. However, one could potentially gain considerable insight into the
reenlistment decision making process from exploring the composition of each cell,
and explaining why certain groups of soldiers cluster together. Similarly, detailed
examination of the cells in which the bonus level is significant should be conducted
in order to understand what types of soldiers respond to bonuses and why.
• Further attempts need to be made to quantify and study the force alignment vari-
ables (such as pay. promotion rates and the form of the reenlistment system) which
impact on the reenlistment program. These variables are potentially as powerful
as the reenlistment cash bonus.
• The enlistment data base from the Military Entrance Processing Command should
be examined for further enlistment variables to explain the first term reenlistment
decision. This data base was not available for this study. Several enlistment vari-
ables were significant in this study's model, however, there are many other
enlistment variables still to examine. Examples of variables that should be exam-
ined include variables that measure a the income of a soldier's parents and the
military background of the soldiers parents and siblings.
• This study used a type of cluster analysis procedure to reduce the number of cells.
However, numerous other techniques are available for use. Many of the techniques
are discussed in a thesis by Misiewicz [Ref. 33: pp. 1-15]. Further research should
examine these additional procedures, particularly shrinkage using Empirical Bayes.
• The annualized cost of leaving (ACOL) model described in Chapter II, together
with more detailed economic variables should be incorporated into this methodol-
ocv.
• Finally, as an alternate solution technique, the use of intervention analysis should
be explored. An article by Box and Tiao should serve as a starting point. [Ref.
34: p. 70].
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APPENDIX A. THE MILITARY REENLISTMENT BONUS MODEL
A. GENERAL
The military reenlistmcnt bonus model is a mathematical programming model for
optimizing the allocation of reenlistmcnt cash bonuses in order to achieve the desired
force structure. The model is essentially a deterministic model. The model was devel-
oped at the Naval Postgraduate School by Major Dean DeWolf. Major Jim Stevens, and
Professor Kevin Wood, and is currently used by the U. S. Marine Corps and the L\ S.
Army [Ref 1: pp. 1-?].
B. INPUTS
The inputs for the model are by military occupation speciality ( MOS). They include:
• Current force structure
• Desired force structure
• Number of soldiers eligible to reenli^t
• Training costs
• Projected reenlistmcnt rates at each bonus level--
Additionally. inputs include the bonus budget, and the maximum size bonus a soldier is
eligible to receive.
C. OUTPUT
The output from the model is recommended bonus levels for each of the 350 MOS's in
each of their three zones. The model also outputs the projected force structure after the
bonus payments.
D. OBJECTIVE FUNCTION
The objective function measures the deviation from the desired force structure.
Deviations in some MOS's are weighted higher because of the MOS's criticality, or be-
cause of the higher investment in training the Army has in certain soldiers.
E. SOLUTION METHODOLOGY
The model is formulated as a linear integer program, and is solved using Lagrangian
relaxation. The solution on a main frame computer averages under ten seconds.
22 Determining the projected reenlistment rate at each bonus level is the purpose oi this study.
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F. MODEL USE
Because of the short run time, and the ease of input and interpretation of results,
this model is extremely valuable to an analyst who must compare numerous alternative
solutions, and perform sensitivity analysis of input variables. Although not specifically
designed for use by budget analyst, the model can also be useful in budget development.
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APPENDIX B. CALCULATION OF REENLISTMENT RATES
A. GENERAL
The purpose of the appendix is to explain how this study deals with four potentially





How the study addresses these four issues has a profound impact on the calculation
of the reenlistmcnt rate. Therefore we start simply by defining how to calculate a
reenlistment rate.
Sumber Soldiers Reenlisting in MOS,





v L _ rt . , ]: _ ,-*„.,.,'.
~ (?)
Each of the complicating factors potentially impacts on this rate calculation. The sim-
plifying assumptions to prevent this are presented here.
B. MOS MIGRATION
MOS migration is when soldiers in an overstrength MOS reenlists into another
understrength MOS. MOS migration is encouraged at the reenlistment point as a way
to align the Army's force structure. The issue is how to count migrating soldiers in the
calculation of reenlistmcnt rates.
MOS migration effects the numerator of the reenlistment equation. There are four
different ways to count migrating soldiers.
• Count in the numerator only soldiers in MOS, who reenlist in MOS,.
• Count in the numerator only soldiers from MOS, who reenlist in MOS, and those
from all other A/05, i=£j who reenlist for MOS,
• Make the reenlistment decision a multinomial choice, to either reenlist for MOS,,
reenlist for any .1/05, i^j or not reenlist.
• Count in the numerator soldiers in MOS, who reenlist in any MOS, including/
By process of elimination, the study chooses the first method of calculation. The
second method is rejected because there is no practical way to predict how many soldiers
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of other MOS's will choose to reenlist in MOS,. The third choice, the multinomial
choice, is rejected due to a technical aspect of the multinomial logit model. This solution
technique works well only in cases in which there are three distinct choices. Here, two
of the choices (to reenlist in MOS, and to reenlist in MOS.) are so similar as to render
the technique ineffective [Ref. 35: p. 362]. The fourth option is rejected because it does
not reflect the number of soldiers who remain in a MOS, which is vital information for
the military reenlistment bonus model. Therefore the first option is selected. The benefit
is this option keeps the model simple, and although there is some potential to underes-
timate the actual numbers of soldiers reenlisting for MOS, it is the best option.
C. EXTENSIONS
Some researchers, such as Goldberg and Warner, treat extensions as a separate de-
cision. They use a multinomial model of three choices (extend, reenlist, and leave the
service) [Ref. 36: p. 17). This study rejects this approach, and instead chooses to treat
extensions as a deferred reenlistment decision. Therefore, only a soldier's final
reenlistment decision is counts in the reenlistment rate calculation. This will case bias
in the rate calculation only if soldiers extend in great numbers and for long periods.
However, less than one in seven soldiers extend, and their primary reason for extending
is to become reenlistment eligible. This method of treating extension is supported by the
research by Cymrot. His conclusion is that the effects of extensions are small, (less than
1%) and he recommends that the inputs to the reenlistment models do not have to be
modified to account for extensions [Ref. 37: pp. 44-40]. Therefore, extensions are ig-
nored, at only a small cost to the accuracy of the model, and at a large benefit to the
model simplicity.
D. REENLISTMENT ELIGIBILITY
This study counts all soldiers who reach their end of term of service (ETS) as eligible
to reenlist. This is not the normal interpretation, as many soldiers are declared ineligible
to reenlist as they do not meet the Army's minimum reenlistment standards. However,
the difficulty with this approach is the data in the gain lose file designating reenlistment
eligible soldiers is widely regarded as unreliable [Ref. 5: p. 26]. Any reenlistment rate
based on this data is also unreliable.
Therefore the best approach is to declare all soldiers who reach ETS as eligible to
reenlist. Since reenlistment eligibility standard have remained relatively unchanged over
the past ten years, this is not an unreasonable approach. The estimation of the number
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of soldiers ineligible to reenlist than becomes a transparent part of the reenlistment rate
computation.
E. EARLY REENLISTMENTS
Currently, soldiers are permitted to reenlist up to eight months prior to their ETS
date. 23 This issue complicates the reenlistment rate calculation by changing the numer-
ator of the reenlistment equation.
In his study Cymrot shows that there is no simple way to account for early
reenlistment s ellect on the reenlistment rate, and that the forecast error of reenlistment
rates is about 2% due to it [Ref. 38: p. 26]. This study recommends that soldiers are only
counted as eligible to reenlist on one date, arbitrary set at six months prior to their ETS
data. 24 This again greatly simplifies the model, although it cause the potential for some
bias in the estimation. The bias is in the case of rising bonus levels, when soldiers who
have previously decided not to reenlist change their minds due to a new, higher bonus
level. In the case of falling bonus levels, there is no bias.
23 Through FY87, first term soldiers were allowed to reenlist six months prior to the end of
their service term, and all other soldiers were permitted to reenlist tliree months prior. Since FY
88. all soldiers are permitted to reenlist eight months prior to the end of their service term.
5i " b of soldiers reenlist eight to six months prior to their ETS. and 35% of soldiers reenlist
six to three months prior, that the six month date is not unrealistic.
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APPENDIX C. VARIABLES TO MEASURE INITIAL MOTIVATION FOR
MILITARY SERVICE
The purpose of this appendix is to more fully explain a soldiers initial motivation for
military service. This is part of the conceptual framework of the military decision-
making process introduced in Chapter III.
The data for these variables comes from the Army gain loss file, except for the un-
employment rate information which is from the Bureau of Labor Statistics.
ACT Army College Fund (ACF) In a very interesting study
of the Navy enlisted force, one researcher finds that
educational programs reward military personnel leav-
ing the service by providing what is in effect a negative
reenlistment bonus, in the form of educational benefits
that can only be used by a lull time civilian student
[Ref. 39: p. 2], It is hypothesized here that a soldier
motivated for military service by college money is less




Studies show that soldiers receiving a reenlistmem bo-
nus at their first reenlistment point are less likely to
reenlist once they reach their second reenlistment point
[Ref. 40: p. 701], Is there a similar effect for soldier
receiving enlistment bonuses? If enlistment bonuses
bring people into the service who otherwise do not en-
list, then these soldiers may show a lower propensity
to reenlist then other soldiers. The Army also uses
enlistment bonuses to induce people to enlist in less
popular job skills. These soldiers may be more likely
to migrate to a new job skill at the end of their
enlistment term.
One theory is that a longer enlistment term may indi-
cate a stronger initial career intent on the part of the
soldier. This is mitigated, however, because a soldier
must enlist for four years to earn an enlistment bonus,
and soldiers receiving enlistment bonuses may have
less career intent.
Enlistment Program Enlistment Program. This vari-
able shows which enlistment or training program the
soldier reenlists for. The purpose is to determine
whether a soldier is job, training or education orien-
tated. Studies show that soldiers in these different
groups have different propensities to reenlist and also
response differently to outside factors such as the state











enlistment program and training the soldier selects
gives insight into the soldiers initial orientation.
Is there a correlation between age at enlistment, and
enlistment motivation? One study by the RAND cor-
poration shows a strong correlation between age at
enlistment and first term attrition-^ |Ref. 41: p. viij.
It is hypothesized here that age at enlistment is also a
predictor of enlistment intent.
Because soldiers enlist for different terms, age at sepa-
ration is not exactly correlated to age at enlistment.
Older soldiers are expected to reenlist at higher rates
then younger ones.
Education at enlistment. Initially, only a variable for
education at reenlistment was included in this study
(see Appendix D for discussion of the variable Educa-
tion). However, education at enlistment can poten-
tially explain a soldiers motivation for entering the
service. Therefore, it is included here also.
Dependents at enlistment. Similar to education, a sol-
diers dependent status at enlistment is included as a
variable in this study.
Has the soldier with prior military service followed by
a break in service explored both the civilian and mili-
tary opportunities available, and now indicated with
his or her choice a strong career intention?
Likewise, is a soldier who is serving in the Reserves or
National Guard and then decides to come on active
duty more career oriented then the average soldier?
Participation in military youth programs such as high
school ROTC may indicate that this individual, like
reserve and prior service soldiers, has made compar-
isons of both civilian and military options available
from a perspective not available to the average person.
Location, along with the economic conditions at that
location are strongly related to enlistment propensity
according to one study [Ref 42: p. 230]. Hometown
information is converted to regional information for
use in this variable. The regions are further combined,
so that five large regions are formed. States in each
region have soldiers with similar reenlistment rates.
The unemployment rate is examined as an indicator of
an individuals motivation to enter the military. Two
different unemployment rates are used here. One is the
25 Soldiers under the age of 18 show significantly higher first term attrition rates then older
soldiers.
average state unemployment rate for the 13 months
prior to the soldier enlisting. The other is the national
rate for the same period. The justification for using
these rates comes from a study on the sensitivity of
first term Navy reenlistments to changes in unemploy-
ment and relative wages [Ref. 40: p. 698]. Unemploy-
ment data comes from the Bureau of Labor Statistics
[Ref. 43: p. 8].
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APPENDIX D. VARIABLES TO MEASURE THE SOLDIERS SUCCESS
IN THE SERVICE
The purpose of this appendix is to further describe variables which measure a sol-
diers success in the service, and his or her satisfaction with military life. This is part of
the conceptual framework of the reenlistment decision-making process introduced in
Chapter III. All data comes from the Army gain loss file except where noted.
CHARACTER OF SERVICE At each reenlistment point, the soldier receives a char-
acter of service. This is a gross indicator of previous
performance, because if the character of service is an-
ything less than honorable, the soldier is not permitted
to reenlist.
PROMOTION RATES Promotion rates of soldiers compared to their peers
within their military occupation specialities appears to
be the best way to measure a soldiers success within
the military. Soldier's enlisted evaluation report scores
and skill qualification test scores also look promising,
but data is not available. The use of promotion rates
as an indicator of success in the military is well sup-
ported in studies such as a RAND study [Ref. 16: p.
v]. The method of calculating promotion rates is the
same used bv Warner in his masters thesis [Ref. 17: p.
38].
AFQT SCORE Armed Forces Qualification Test. Two studies, one by
the RAND Corporation, and one by an NPS student
use intelligence and education scores to predict pro-
motion rates. AFQT. plus the following three vari-
ables (mental test category. GT score, and education
level) arc measures of intelligence and education, al-
though each comes with serious and well documented
shortcomings as a measurement tool. Additionally, the
results of studies which use these variables as predic-
tors are not particularly strong [Ref. 16: p. 3] [Ref. 17:
p. 120]. Despite its shortcomings, the Army makes
frequent use of this measure of intelligence.
MENTAL TEST CATEGORY This variable is also one of those used to predict pro-
motion rates. Mental test category is a discrete version
of the AFQT, ranging from 1 (highest) to 5 (lowest).
Each category is further broken into sub-categories.
The mental test category is hampered by the same in-
consistencies described for the AFQT.
GT TEST SCORE General-Technical Test Score on the Armed Forces





used to predict promotion rates. The Army uses this
test score data to measure trainability.
The final variable used to predict promotion rates.
The problem with the measure of education level
available in the data base is that it does not distinguish
between soldiers who are high school graduates and
those who earn a hich school equivalencv credential
(GED).26
Since the study examines education at enlistment, and
education at the reenlistment point, it also examines
whether soldier who have improve their education level
during their enlistment term have different enlistment
probabilities then those who do not.
An Army Research Institute researcher discusses the
use of tenure in the service as predictor of organiza-
tional commitment and reenlistment propensity [Ref.
44: pp. 5-6]. He measures tenure with four factors:
years-of-service. status, rank and increasing responsi-
bility. Data is available on years-of-service and rank.
A second measure of tenure.
This study uses duty location as a quality of life vari-
able. A study of first term reenlistment decisions finds
that Army enlistees who are stationed overseas have a
higher reenlistment rate, and those stationed in the
northeast United States have a lower reenlistment rate
then average [Ref. 8: p. 23J. The duty station is con-
verted into regional or overseas location.
Researchers note that quality of life issues are rela-
tively insignificant for the first term soldier [Ref. 20:
pp. 11-14J. The reason may be that many first term
soldiers do not yet have families, while later term sol-
diers do. Soldiers with families, or who support de-
pendents should reenlist at higher rates then single
soldiers do. This thesis defines a soldier as having de-
pendents if he has any legal dependents, whether they
are children, parents, or other relatives.
CHANGE IN DEPENDENTS Does a soldiers who starts his or her family while in the
military display different reenlistment propensity then
single soldiers, or those who entered with families?




26 Education level data which distinguishes between GED graduates and high school diploma
graduates is onlv available from 1985 on.
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APPENDIX E. VARIABLES TO MEASURE A SOLDIERS POTENTIAL
IN THE CIVILIAN SECTOR
The purpose of this appendix is to more fully explain a soldiers evaluation of his or
her potential in the civilian sector. This is part of the conceptual framework of the
reenlistment decision making process introduced in Chapter III. The data is this group
comes from the appropriate government agency, and from the Army gain loss file.
RACE The study includes race and sex as surrogates variables
to describe a soldier's evaluation of his or her potential
in the civilian sector verses the military. Researchers
find higher reenlistment rates among black soldiers
than white soldiers. The researchers hypothesis this is
due to several factors, such as insufficient job oppor-
tunities for blacks in the civilian sector as compared to
military career options, and enhanced promotion op-
portunities in the militar) [Ref. 14: pp. 29-30]. There-
fore race becomes an indicator of differing
opportunities available to soldiers in civilian sector and
the military.
ETHNIC GROUP For similar reasons as for race, a soldiers ethnic group
is included as a variable.
SEX Studies also note higher reenlistment rates among
women then men for first term soldiers- 7 [Ref. 1-4: p.
29]. Again, researchers hypothesis this represents more
opportunities for women in the military then they find
in the civilian sector [Ref. 14: pp. 29-30].
JOB TYPE The purpose of this variable is to attempt to capture
different civilian opportunities for differing job catego-
ries. Most researchers agree that soldiers with "high
tech" training have sreater civilian opportunities than
do other soldiers [Ref. 2: p. S] [Ref. 4: p. 253]. This
variable also captures the expected lower bonus re-
sponse rates for jobs that are risky or dangerous [Ref.
4: p. 231]. The Army's administrative grouping of job
skills into categories called career management fields
(CMF), which we do not use because CMF's often
group occupations with little in common [Ref. 5: p.
4]. 28 This study uses instead modified groupings from
27 Women have a higher attrition rate then men during the first term. However if they com-
plete the first term, women reenlist at a higher rate then men.
28 For example. CMF's group job skills as diverse as a cannon crewman and a Persliing mis-
sile electronics specialist into the same category.
65
the Department of Defense Occupation Conversion
Manual [Kef. 45: pp. 9-17].
UNEMPLOYMENT RATE Numerous studies find unemployment rates positively
correlated with retention rates, and that unemploy-
ment rates reflect civilian employment opportunities
[Ref. 6: p. 16). Additionally, the unemployment rate,
(along with GNP and CPI) indicate the health of the
national economy [Ref. 2: p. 54]. A study for the L\
S. Navy titled "The Sensitivity of First Term Navy
Reenlistment to Changes in Unemployment and Rela-
tive Wages" addresses the wide range of issues dealing
with which unemployment rates to use?9 [Ref. 40: p.
54]. This study uses two. the state unemployment rate
for the 13 months prior to the soldiers enlistment (dis-
cussed in Appendix C), and the national unemploy-
ment rate for the three quarters prior to the soldier
making his reenlistment decision. Unemployment data
comes from the Bureau of Labor Statistics [Ref. 43: p.
8].
C/M WAGE INDEX Civilian Military Wage Index. Surprisingly, studies do
not find civilian military pay indexes to be explanatory
of the reenlistment decision making process. Only one
Navy study finds them to be significant predictors of
reenlistments [Ref. 36: p. 32]. Numerous others find
this not to be true [Ref. 14: p. iii] [Ref. 40: p. 707] [Ref.
8: pp. 35-36] [Ref. 9: pp. 40-43], The difficulty here is
trying to measure the civilian earning potential of sol-
diers. One approach is to use veterans earnings as a
way to estimate the earning potential of soldiers in the
civilian sector. However this introduces selection bias
into the data, because veterans who choose to leave
the service do so because they expect higher civilian
earnings than those who stay. Therefore any estimate
of civilian wage potential based on veterans earnings
is upwards biased [Ref. 11: p. 203] [Ref. 46: p. v]. An-
other difficulty with measuring civilian pay opportu-
nities of soldiers is matching military skills with skills
found in the civilian sector. Despite the above short-
comings, this study includes the civilian military wage
index as a variable. The source of data is the Bureau
of Labor Statistics [Ref. 43: pp. 115-177].
CPI Consumer Price Index. Like unemployment and gross
national product, CPI is a general measure of the state
of the national economy, and therefore employment
29 The issues break down into whether to use national, regional, or local unemployment rates;
whether to use the rates for all workers or those for the 17-24 age group: and how much should the
effects of unemployment be led or lagged.
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opportunity. The source of data is the Labor Statistics
[Ref. 4": pp. 13-16].
GNP Gross National Product. GXP also indicates the
health of the national economy, and therefore indicates
the civilian employment prospects of military person-
nel. None of the studies reviewed for this paper in-
clude GNP as a variable, although GNP is the most
frequently used measure of the state o[ the national
economy. GNP data is from U. S. Department of
Commerce [Ref. 48: p. 3].
CIVILIAN JOB GROWTH This study hypothesizes that the percentage growth in
civilian jobs is a more accurate indicator of actual em-
ployment opportunities than is the unemployment
rate. Data come from the Bureau of Labor Statistics
[Ref. 43: p. 30].
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APPENDIX F. REENLISTMENT POLICY VARIABLES
The purpose of this appendix is to more fully explain the reenlistment policy vari-
ables in this study. The variables are part of the conceptual framework of the
reenlistment decision making process of Chapter III. Data in this section comes from
the Army gain loss file except where noted.
RETIREMENT SYSTEM The purpose of this variable is to account for changes
in the retirement system made four years ago. Soldiers
enlisting before this date received benefits under the
old retirement system. The new retirement system is





One of the strongest predictors of reenlistment behav-
ior is the number of years to retirement. However, this
variable is most useful in predicting Zone B and Zone
C reenlistment rates. The years to retirement have lit-
tle influence on Zone A soldiers, with the major impact
not felt until the seventh year [Ref. 14: p. 17].
Real Military Compensation. RMC is a measure of
compensation that accounts for the fact that not all
of a soldiers income is in the form of direct pay. RMC
accounts for the housing and substance allowances
that soldiers receive either in cash or in kind (in the
form of government housing). RMC also counts as
income the tax advantage a soldier gets because hous-
ing and substance pavments are not taxable. Due to
the fact that the military compensation system is suffi-
cientlv complex, there is considerable evidence that
soldiers systematically and significantly undervalue
their compensation [Ref. 41: p. vij. Changes in pay
rates, rather than actual pay rates where used in this
study.
This variable takes into account how pay (and other
forms of military compensation) keep pace with in-
flation.
The bonus payment level is the policy variable Army
policy makers can most easily manipulate. Since bo-
nuses are paid to soldiers in job skills with low re-
tention rates, normally the presence of a bonus
indicates that the job skill is in high civilian demand
or is an unpopular or demanding job. Bonus payment
data comes from the Force Alignment branch of the








The method of computing the amount of a
reenlistment cash bonus has not changed since 1974.
However, the method of payment has changed. From
April 1979 to January 1982. the cash bonus was paid
to the soldier in a lump sum on the day of reenlistment.
However, in 1982 the method changed from a lump
sum to a one-half lump sum payment, with the re-
mainder of the bonus paid in yearly installments.
Studies show that the full lump sum payment induces
more soldiers to reenlist then the alternate payment
system [Ref. 6: p. 6] The data base includes records of
soldiers under both payment systems. Bonus type data
comes from the Force Alignment branch of the U. S.
Army Total Army Personnel Command.
The Army permits selected soldiers to change job skills
at the reenlistment point. The force alignment needs
of the dictate the number of soldiers who change job
skills. The Army oilers soldiers in overstrength MOS's
the opportunity to change to understrength MOS's.
These soldiers normally do not receive a bonus, how-
ever their reward for changing MOS's is increased
promotion opportunity in the new MOS. This variable
indicates whether the soldier is in an overstrength
MOS and eligible to reenlist. Migration opportunity
data comes from the Force Alignment branch of the
U. S. Army Total Army Personnel Command.
An earlier variable looks at the promotion rate of a
soldier respect to his peers. This variable looks at the
promotion rate as a force alignment variable which the
Army manipulates. Promotion forecasts come from
the Force Alignment branch of the U. S. Army Total
Army Personnel Command.
Reenlistment eligibility criteria change over time. The
data base contains a variable coding reenlistment el-
igibility, however this designation is highly suspect
[Ref. 5: p. 26]. We are not able to independently de-
termine from the data records whether a soldier is eli-
gible to reenlist. as reenlistment eligibility depends
partially on discipline and performance records not
available for this study. Therefore, this variable
measures which set of reenlistment eligibility criteria is
in effect at the time the soldier reenlists.
The purpose of this variable is to attempt to quantify
how liberal the reenlistment system is in giving a sol-
dier his or her reenlistment choice of training or duty
assignment. This study subjectively assigned values to
this variable, based on interviews with the reenlistment
managers at the U. S. Total Army Personnel Com-
mand. The general feeling is that from FY82 through
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FY83, the reenlistment system was moderately re-
sponsive to soldier's needs. From FY84 through
FY87. the reenlistment system was less responsive to
soldier's needs, and during FY88 and FY89 it has been
more highly responsive to soldier's needs. This assess-
ment is due to changes in the reenlistment system that
occurred on 1 October 1983. and in 1 April 1988.
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APPENDIX G. MISSING DATA
A. PURPOSE
The purpose of this appendix is to show the amount of missing data present in the
data set after cleaning, and to demonstrate why no further cleaning of the data set is
required.
B. MISSING DATA AFTER CLEANING
Table 9 contains a listing of the 30 categorical variable, and the amount of missing
data present after cleaning. The amount of remaining missing data ranges from 0-7.8%,
with 23 variables missing less than 1%.
C. RANDOM MISSING DATA
To determine if further cleaning of the data is necessary, the data set is examined to
see if the observations with missing data are a random sample of the data set. If they
are. then eliminating the observations with missing data will not change the results of
the analysis, and additional cleaning will not be needed.
First, the number of observations with at least one missing value is calculated, using
the ten variables from Table 9 with the most missine data. The results are in Fieure 16.
DATA CUMULATIVE CUMULATIVE
MISSING FREQUENCY PERCENT FREQUENCY PERCENT
NO 69570 91.8 69570 91.8
YES 6208 8.2 75778 100.0
Figure 16, Number of Observations With Missing Values
As can be seen, only S.2% of all observations have one or more missing values. This
amount is acceptable, provided the observations with missing values are a randomly
distributed throughout the data set. To determine this, we test the hypothesis that the
reenlistment rate for the those with missing data is the same as the reenlistment rate for
those without missing data. Figure 17 gives the reenlistment rates.
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MISSING NO REENLIST REENLIST
NO 0.617824 0.382176
YES 0.619845 0.380155
Figure 17. Reenlistment Rates for Observations With Missing Data
Obviously, the reenlistment rate for those observations missing data is very close to
that for those not missing data. To show this formally, we test the hypothesis:
HQ : P x = P2 (8)
/-/,: P, ± P2 (9)
Where P
]
is the probability o( reenlisting of an observations without missing data, and
P
:
is the probability of reenlisting of an observations with missing data. The test statistic
is:
A'(On 22 - O^O-,,)
2
T= *~ < 10 >
n
]
n2C ] C 2
where A' is the total number of observations. //,. n 2 . Cu C2 are the row and column totals
and Ou , 22 , Ou , 2] are the cell frequencies.
The critical region is to reject 7/ at a = 0.05 if 7" exceeds Xf_s , the (1 — a) quantile
of a chi-square random variable with 1 degree of freedom [Ref. 27: pp. 145-146], Since
T = 0.09866 is much less than Xf_ 05 = 7.879, we do not reject the null hypothesis. The
level of significance of the test is greater then a = 0.25
Therefore, since the missing values appear to be randomly distributed throughout
the data set. further cleaning of the data is not required.
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APPENDIX H. LOG-LINEAR MODELS
The purpose of this appendix is to explain the use of log-linear models in the study
of categorical data sets. The log-linear model is analogous to the familiar analysis of
variance (ANOVA) techniques, except that log-linear models are for dichotomous re-
sponse variables, where the ANOVA is for continuous response variables. Both are for
use with categorical explanatory variables.
The standard log-linear model is Equation 11. where p,. pp pk are the probabilities
associated with the different variables.
Rate = Appjpk (11)
Taking the natural logarithm of this equation yields Equation 12.
Rate = \nA+ \np
t
+ In pj+ lnpk (12)
The SAS statistical procedure CATMOD uses a maximum likelihood estimate solved
by a iterative proportional fitting procedure to yield estimators that are the best
asymptotic normal estimators [Ref 49: p. 35]. The properties of iterative method of
proportional fitting of the log-linear model are summarized from Bishop [Ref. 26: p. S3].
• It always converges to the required Ml E.
• A stopping rule is available to ensure the desired accuracy is obtained.
• Starting values may be set for the estimates.
The SAS categorical modeling procedure performs hypothesis tests to determine if
the estimated parameters are significantly different from zero. The test statistic is a
Wald statistic, which is approximated by a chi square distribution [Ref. 49: p. 35].
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APPENDIX I. LOGISTIC REGRESSION
The purpose of this appendix is to describe the regression techniques used in this
thesis.
The key issue in selecting the regression techniques is the dichotomous response
variable. Soldiers make only one of two mutually exclusive reenlistment decisions, ether
to reenlist or leave the service. ?o
Since the response variable is binary, the desired result of the regression equation is
the probability of success (reenlistment) of a given soldier.
Pi = Pi Y, = 1) (13)
Where Y, = \ 0, 1 }.
To apply a ordinary least squares regression to this, the following interpretation is
made. The general form of the linear regression model is:
Y
t
= fio + hXt+tt (14)
If/1
,
is the probability that )', = 1. then:
ELYi] = P
t
= fa + Wi (15)
if £[£,.] = 0, This is the linear probability model [Ref. 50: p. 12] [Ref. 35: p. 756].
There are a number of reasons why using ordinary least squares regression is not
adequate for models having categorical response variables.
• By definition, the probability P
t
in Equation 13 must take on values between and
1. However, using the linear regression model, the P
t
can fall outside the 0, 1 range.
Figure IS shows this where the solid line represents an actual probability function,
and the dashed line represents a linear approximation to it. In this example,
the linear approximation goes outside the 0, 1 ranee for admissible /?„ + /?,A', [Ref.
51: p. 4],
30 Some researchers study a multinomial reenlistment choice, however for reasons described
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Figure 18. Linear Approximation to a Probability Function
• Linear regression uses the assumption of constant variance of errors. E\tf] = a 2 .
However, the variance of the error term for a binary variable, where each obser-
vation is assumed to be a Bernoulli trial, with probability of success P, is:
VarlE[\ = (/? + /?,A})( l-fiQ -fit X} (16)
Since the variance of the errors depends on the observation, the c, do not have
constant variance. L'se of ordinary least square regression models produces ineffi-
cient estimates and imprecise predictions [Ref. 35: pp. 419-422],
• The assumption that the }", are normally distributed is not valid with binary data.
This is obvious, as the }', are either or 1. Since they are not normally distributed,
no estimation that is linear in )', is efficient [Ref. 35: pp. 419-422].
• The usual tests of significance for the estimated coefficient do not apply when using
ordinary least squares on observations with binary response variables; estimated
standard errors are not constant, and R 2 does not have its usual interpretation [Ref.
35: pp. 419-422].
The solution to the above problems are transformations. The two most widely used
transformation are the probit and the logit transformations. The probit transformation,
which is based on the normal CDF is:
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Pi = ,-'»<i< (17)







Both of these transformations work well when there are sufficient repeated observations
available (when the explanatory variables are categorical). If. however, there are few
repeated observations (continuous explanatory variables) then a maximum likelihood
estimation of the lock model is used. 31 The data for the model is shown in Figure 19.
DATA
NUMBER OF NUMBER OF EXPLANATORY
TRIALS IN SUCCESSES IN VARIABLES
OBSERVATION I OBSERVATION I
M S XI X2 ... XN
M s XI X2 ... XN
• • • •
• • • •
M s XI X2 ... XN
Figure 19. Data Format for Logistic Regression
In this case the explanatory variables are continuous, and there is only one trial per
observation (M — 1) and S, is either 1 or (success of failure). [Ref. 35: pp. 419-422]
31 While the logit transformation is somewhat arbitrary, it is selected because it is simple,
tractable and well behaved even when the normality of/., is violated.
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1 he following discussion of the development of logistic regression is summarized
from Judge [Ref. 35: pp. 425-436] and Nerlove [Ref. 51: pp. 14-22). Using the binomial
distribution, the probability of a success in observation / is defined as:
' \ f \
p{N
t
= s) = rJ)pni-PdM'-' (i9)
where M, = 1 and 5 = 1




1 4- e~' -
where:
XtfL—Y/vh (21)




Following the procedures for computing a maximum likelihood estimator in Larsen [Ref.
52: p. 262]. First take the natural log of the likelihood function, and substitute the ex-
pressions for P, and 1 — P,.
In L - Yjn(^ -S, In (1 + e**) + (Mt - St) [J£ -ln( 1 + e**)] (23)
The next step is to take the derivative and set equal to zero, however this is not possible
as the derivative is non-linear in the estimators. Instead, a Xewton-Raphson method is




- Mi - «, + T "
(24)
The first step of the iteration is to compute the weights





U: = W \ M^'+^A
y=i
(27)
The nest step is to perform a least square regression of dependent variables }' and the
weighted dependent variables Ua U,-
j] = (C 7 rf ] i: T Y (28]
Next, the estimates /? n are updated.




The procedure is continued until the estimates converge.





The above discussion is summarized from Judge [Ref. 35: pp. 425-436] and Xerlove [Ref.
51: pp. 14-22].
The statistical package of this study is the LOGIST procedure of the SAS statistical




described above. Some specifics on the assumptions of the procedures, and the test
statistics are:
• The assumption of the binary model is that the probability that }' = 1 is given by
Equation 31.
• The response variable can be nominally scaled.
The Logit model has few assumptions, and is robust to the assumptions of ordinary
least squares regression.
The logit transformation can be applied to a multivariate setting. This is justified,
because the marginal distributions of the multivariate logit transformations are
themselves logit transformations.
The SAS LOG I ST procedure examines two way interactions between variables, but
higher order interactions are assumed to be zero.
• The form of the residuals is undetermined, however the transformed residuals
should be approximately normally distributed.
• Test of hypotheses and confidence intervals in the SAS LOGIST procedure are
constructed from estimates of the asymptotic covariance matrix using Wald statis-
tics. These rely on the asymptotic nature of the maximum likelihood estimator.
The confidence intervals could also be determined using a bootstrapping (resampl-
ing) procedure developed by Efron. [Ref. 54: pp. 5-18],
• The R statistic is similar to the multiple correlation coefficient in the normal setting
after a correction is made to penalize for the number of estimated parameters.
• The SAS LOGIST procedure has a forward stepwise regression option, which is
used in this study. Where a least squares stepwise regression uses a /statistic for
variable selection, the SAS LOGIST procedure uses a Rao's efficiency score sta-
tistic. Similar to least squares regression, care must be taken in using the stepwise
SAS LOGIST procedure. If arbitrarily applied without proper safeguards, a step-
wise procedure can lead to an inaccurate model. One of the most effective methods
to ensure performance of a stepwise procedure is to cross-validate the model.
These issues are discussed in more depth in Freedman. [Ref. 55: p. 152],
• If a variable is a linear combination of other variables already in the model, then
it will not be added to the model in the stepwise SAS LOGIST procedures.
• finally, a SAS LOGIST NOFIT procedure is used as a diagnostic tool prior the
fitting of models using stepwise procedures. This procedure tests the null hypoth-
esis that all regression coefficients are zero. The NOFIT option is useful in finding
out if any modeling is worth while at all.
The above are summarized from Judge [Ref. 35: pp. 425-436], Nerlove [Ref. 51: pp.
14-22], and Harrell [Ref. 53: pp. 181-202].
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APPENDIX J. CLUSTER ANALYSIS RESULTS
This appendix gives the results of the clustering of cells, which is described in
Chapter V. The soldier population is first partitioned into 1080 cells, and then in a two
step procedure this number is reduced to thirty-six cells. The assumption is that each
of these cells is a grouping of soldiers with a similar probability of reenlisting. The as-
sumption is tested in this appendix, using a non-parametric goodness-of-fit test.
The cells are coded to identify which groups of soldiers belong to them. The coding
is by the seven variables used to define the cells. Those variables (in the order in which








The number in each position of the coding represents the category of the variable re-
presented. The possible categories for each variable are:








(3-E3 or below. 4-L4. 5-E5 and above)
(1-no dependents, 2-married or single with dependents)
(1-white. 2-black, 3-other)
(1 -northeast, 2-mid-atlantic. 5-south. 7-midwest, 8-west)
(1-low, 2-medium. 3-high civilian opportunity)
An asterisk in the coding means that the given all categories in the given variable are
combined, plus all categories of all remaining variables in the hierarchical structure are
combined. Two numbers with parentheses around them represent two categories
grouped together.
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Three examples of this coding scheme are provided. The first, in Equation 32, re-
presents all soldiers who enlisted for three or more years, are male, are of rank E4. with
dependents, are of a ethnic group of other than white or black, are from the south, and
are in an VIOS that provides a medium level of civilian opportunity.
3 14 2 3 5 2 (32)
The coding of Equation 33 represents all soldiers who enlisted for two years and are fe-
male. (The asterisk means that the cell contains soldiers in all categories of the variables
RANK, DEPENDENTS, RACE, REGION and JOB TYPE.)
2 2 * (33)
The coding of Equation 34 represents all soldiers who enlisted for two years, are male.
are of rank E3. and are cither black or in the other ethnic code classification.
213 1(2 3)* (34)
Tables 10 and 11 give the composition of each cell.
Figures 20 and 21 give the expected reenlistment rate for each of the 36 cells, and
the number of observations of a sample of 75.77S total.
We now te^t the assumption that a cell is a grouping of soldiers with a similar
probability of reenlistment. To do this, we use the validation data we have been saving.
A chi-square goodness-of-fit test is preformed, testing the assumed distribution function
on each cell of the validation data. The hypothesis is that the observations in a given
cell are distributed Binomial (n, p) where p is the estimated reenlistment rate given in
Figures 20 and 21. In the test statistic in Equation 35. 0, is the observed number of
soldiers reenlisting.
2
is the observed number of soldiers leaving the ser\ice. £, is the





The decision rule is to reject H if 7^ is greater than A\_
x
, the (1-c.) quantile of a chi-
square random variable with 1 degree of freedom. In this test, A',_, = 3.S41 for a = 0.05
and X,. = 10.83 for a = 0.001. Figures 20 and 21 list the reenlistment rate for the each
82
validation cell and the T statistic for each cell. For any goodness-of-fit test, the null
hypothesis is rejected if the sample size is allowed to get large enough [Ref. 27: pp.
190-191]. Cells 15 and 55 show this, as they are cells with larger sample sizes, and
moderate differences in probability (less than one percent), yet they have large T statis-
tics. Therefore, even though some of the tests reject the null hypothesis, the overall ef-
fect of the chi-square test is to confirm the distributional assumptions of the cells.
Therefore, we conclude that we have partitioned the population into cells of soldiers with
similar reenlistment probabilities.
Table 10. CLUSTER RESULTS BY ZONE
CELL #
Cell 1 22* 315111 *
Cell 2 2132* 2131(23)* 32411(18)*
Cell 3 21311 * 3131 :
Cell 5 2142* 32411(27)* 32421*
Cell 6 21411 • 323* 3132*
Cell 7 2 141(23 >*
Cell S 215* 3241(23)*
Cell 12 324115* 3151122 3152113
Cell 15 3242(23)*
Cell 16 32511*
Cell P 3251(23)* 3152152 3152172 3142252
Cell IS 3252*
Cell 22 3 1 5 1 1 2( 1 3
)
3151183
Cell 21 315115* 315117*




Cell 2S 3151(23)* 315211(12) 3152122 3152151 13) 315217(13)
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Table 1 1. CLUSTER RESULTS BY ZONE (CONTINUED)
CELL #
Cell 31 315212(13)
Cell 37 315218* 314235(13) 314221*
Cell 38 3152(23)*
Cell 39 3 14231 * 314232(23)
Cell 41 3142321 314237(13)
Cell 43 3142352 3142372




Cell 4" 3142383 3142113




3142223 314227(13) 3142172 3141252
Cell 52 3142251 314228*
Cell 54 3142253 3142272
Cell 58 314211(12) 3141322 314135(12) 314128*
Cell 63 314217(13)
Cell 66 314131* 314111*
Cell To 3141353 3141122 3141152 3141173
Cell 72 3141372 314121*
Cell 73 314138 : 3141121 3141123 314118*
Cell 76 3141222 314125(13) 3141272
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CELL
MODEL BUILDING DATA VALIDATION DATA
SAMPLE PERCENT SAMPLE PERCENT
SIZE REENLISTING SIZE REENLISTING T
1 1013 .311945 970 .312371 0.00
2 928 .246767 950 .251579 0.11
3 5409 .081161 5439 .080530 0.02
5 3094 .347447 3274 .367440 6.04
6 4583 .130700 4406 .128007 0.35
7 458 .283843 405 . 244444 3.12
8 1575 .532698 1582 .530973 0.03
12 481 .484407 467 .456103 1.46
15 1845 .595122 1834 .585605 183.
16 407 .449631 380 .410526 2.39
17 834 .701439 791 .701643 0.00
18 880 .643182 886 .638826 0.07
22 1759 .363275 1834 .371865 0.62
24 1190 .398319 1138 .384007 0.93
26 4260 .276291 4290 .286713 2.46
28 3303 .635966 3042 .638067 0.06
31 1714 .578763 1684 .592043 1.18
37 910 .550549 928 .607759 12.5
38 1786 .800112 1809 .799889 0.00
39 244 .606557 245 .526531 6.65
41 368 .472826 421 .441805 1.64
43 232 .607759 234 .585470 0.50
46 10266 .433275 10374 .427607 1.23
47 470 .340426 469 .432836 18.0
49 1331 .514651 1433 .501047 1.12
50 443 .668172 432 .618056 4.86
Figure 20. Number of Observations and Reenlistment Rates by Cell
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CELL
MODEL BUILDING DATA VALIDATION DATA
SAMPLE PERCENT SAMPLE PERCENT
SIZE REENLISTING SIZE REENLISTING T
51 2407 .560033 2310 .553247 341.
52 930 .600000 923 .582882 1.13
54 743 .647376 802 .665835 1.25
58 1452 .404270 1449 .402346 0.02
63 1604 .459476 1559 .463117 0.11
66 2324 .206540 2269 .228735 6.53
70 2635 .310816 2701 .276564 14.9
72 259 .374517 287 .324042 3.18
73 10120 .246739 10029 .246086 0.05
76 3621 .483568 3610 .497230 2.53
Figure 21. Number of Observations and Reenlistment Rates by Cell (Continued)
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APPENDIX K. REGRESSION ANALYSIS RESULTS
The purpose of this appendix is to present the regression analysis results for each
cell. A stepwise logistic regression procedure estimates the coefficients. A description
of the method of inclusion of variables appears in Appendix I. Except for the intercept
terms, all coefficients are significant at the c. = 0.05 level. Those intercepts terms for
which a > 0.05 are marked with a double asterisk. Estimates with a single asterisk are
significant at the a = 0.01 level. Table 12 and Table 13 list the results.
The results arc the transformed coefficient estimates. To compute the actual
recnlistment rates, use Equation 35. where /? is the vector of estimates, and X is the





The variables labels of the tables are as follows:
• Inter INTERCEPT
• Var 1 BONUS LEVEL
• Var 2 REENLISTMENT SYSTEM
• Var 3 AFQT SCORE
• Var -4 PROMOTION RATE
• Var 5 PAY RATE
• Var 6 AGE AT ENTRY
• Var 7 UNEMPLOYMENT RATE
UNEMPLOYMENT RATE is not listed on chart. Only two cells include this variable
and results are listed here. Cell 52 includes the variable UNEMPLOYMENT RATE
with a coefficient estimate of 0.105. It is significant at the 2 = 0.01 level. Cell 73 in-
cludes the variable UNEMPLOYMENT RATE with a coefficient estimate of -0.036. It
is significant at the a = 0.01 level. The R values are listed under the cell number for each
cell.
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Table 12. REGRESSION RESULTS B\ ZONE
Cell U
(R Val)
Inter Var 1 Var 2 Var 3 Var 4 Var 5 Var 6
Cell 1
(0.095)












-0.007 * 0.036 *
Cell 6
(0.242)












-0.543 0.114 :: 0.033
Cell 16
(0.130)
l.ool ::: -0.017 *
Cell 17
(0.135)
2.198 * 0.198 * -0.084
Cell 18
(0.158)
-0.19S -o.o 11 -0.033 * 0.066 *
Cell 22
01.140)
-1.097 0.209 * -0.012 •'• 0.057
Cell 24
OLIO)
0.003 0.170 * -0.009 *
Cell 26
(0.128)
-1.604 * 0.278 * 0.131 * O.O40 *
Cell 2S
(0.144)
0.940 * 0. 1 79 * -0.010 * -0.025 *
Cell 31
(0.137)
0.646 * 0.200 * -0.008 -0.029 *
Cell 37
(0.093)
-0.303 0.176 0.160 *




Inter Var 1 Var 2 Var 3 Var 4 Var 5 Var 6
Cell 38
(0.177)


















-0.239 0.0S8 0. 1 75
Cell 50
(0.179)




-0.133 0.183 ' 0.025 *
Cell 52
(0.163)
-0.917 * 0.220 * 0.226 * 0.038 ;::
Cell 54
(0.12(0
0.155 0.318 0.012 o.o2 l )
Cell 5S
(0.144)
-1.094 * 0.086 * 0.022 0.086 ::;
Cell 63
(0.122)
-0.683 * 0.170 '• 0.242 *
Cell 66
(0.100)
-1.907 * 0.188 * 0.149 * 0.046 ;;:
Cell 70
(0.111)






-1.278 * (J. 260 * 0.0S7 * 0.008 0.032 *
Cell 76
(0.138)
-0.398 * 0.160 * 0.135 * 0.O43 *
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